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I. INTRODUCTION

Social media use continues to grow exponentially among employees,
and employers are struggling to draft policies that both effectively protect
their business while not impinging upon employees’ rights to engage in
protected concerted activities. 1 Numerous entities are articulating new
standards to deal with the growing use of social media. 2 The General

1

See infra text accompanying note 45 (detailing attempts by employers to draft
policies that govern employees’ online conduct).
2
See infra text accompanying notes 30–31, 188–189, 195, 203–204, 210
(explaining that the GC issued three memos analyzing social media specific cases, in addition
to a memo focusing exclusively on social media policies. In addition, the Federal Trade
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Counsel (GC) of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is taking an
active interest in employees’ use of social media to discuss working
conditions.3 The GC recently released three memoranda analyzing whether
employees’ social media activities are protected concerted activity under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).4 In the most recent memo, the GC
focused exclusively on social media policies.5 The GC analyzed overly broad
policies attempting to address a variety of issues, including protected
concerted activity, insider trading, and employer endorsements. 6
Additionally, for the first time ever, the GC approved an entire social media
policy as lawful and included a copy of the policy for employers.7 However,
employers continue struggling to develop effective social media policies
despite the availability of the GC’s advice memos.8
In addition to the GC providing protection to employees’ online
conduct, individual state legislation is also providing protection to employees
who engage in social media activities. 9 Specific states have off-duty
protection statutes providing protection to employees for off-duty conduct,
and in 2013, several states enacted employment-specific social media
legislation, while others continue work to enact similar legislation. 10
Employers must also consider whether their business is located in a state
requiring termination for good cause or having anti-bullying legislation.11
Thus, the breadth of restrictions employers need to consider is quite broad

Commission issued new rules to regulate internet endorsements, and the FBI recently funded a
dedicated task force to scour social media for insider trading violations).
3
See infra text accompanying notes 45–47 (discussing three memos published
by the GC specifically focusing on the social media’s impact in the employment context).
4
See infra text accompanying notes 30–31, 188–189, 195 (discussing these three
memos. The GC’s memo shows employers continue to struggle drafting lawful policy
provisions because the GC’s memo dedicates 20 pages to analyzing unlawful policy
provisions).
5
See infra text accompanying note 46 (explaining that the GC’s memo
addressed only social media policies and whether the provisions were lawful or unlawful).
6
See infra text accompanying notes 57–66, 69–72, 84–92, 102–103, 106–109,
122–127, 172–174, 177–181, 190–194, 198, 202, 209, 216–219 (providing the overly broad
policy language embracing protected concerted activity and attempting to address insider
trading, employer product, or service endorsements).
7
See infra text accompanying note 47 (detailing why the GC approved an entire
social media policy and incorporating a copy of the approved policy).
8
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that employers continue to
struggle to draft lawful social media policies).
9
See infra text accompanying notes 227–229 (detailing the states with off-duty
protection statutes or acts specifically addressing social media in the employment context).
10
See infra text accompanying notes 227–229 (discussing state off-duty
protection statutes).
11
See infra text accompanying notes 231, 261 (explaining that Montana requires
termination for good cause and other states have anti-bullying statutes).
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and extends further than just the GC’s concerns for protected concerted
activity.12
This comment provides an in-depth analysis of the GC’s first
approved social media policy in light of the GC’s recent application of labor
laws to the social media policy context and other restrictions employers must
consider when drafting a policy.13 This comment reviews both the approved
policy and the GC’s analysis setting forth why he deemed it lawful, and
describes why other policy provisions are lawful.14 Comparing the approved
policy with other lawful policy provisions demonstrates that the GC
consistently analyzes certain policy provisions and provides employers some
reliable tools to use when drafting a social media policy.15 However, not all
the approved policy provisions warranted the GC’s seal of approval.16
Many of the approved policy provisions are inadequate because
individual state legislation is not properly incorporated, and the GC’s
inconsistency in evaluating specific social media policy provisions warrants
consideration before implementation. 17 Additionally, the policy does not
incorporate off-duty protection statutes or new legislation specifically
governing social media in the employment context. 18 The GC is also
inconsistent in his analysis of many policy provisions, including veiled
threats against employees, provisions requiring honesty and accuracy,
provisions encouraging employees to utilize internal procedures, and
provisions attempting to limit discussions of confidential information in
violation of insider trading regulations.19 The highlighted deficiencies are not
without remedies, but require employers to engage in thoughtful, thorough
consideration to cure the approved policy’s weaknesses.20

12

See infra text accompanying notes 203–204, 227–231, 261 (describing
additional FTC regulations, termination for good cause, anti-bullying statutes, and insider
trading considerations employers need to consider).
13
See infra text accompanying notes 30–32, 44–45, 132–135 (detailing the old
labor laws being applied in the social media context, both for protected concerted activity and
employer surveillance).
14
See infra text accompanying notes 276–277, 281–282, 285–287, 291–292,
298–306 (analyzing why additional provisions of the approved policy are lawful).
15
See infra text accompanying notes 66–68, 73–75, 278–295 (providing the
analysis as to why the approved policy provisions are lawful).
16
See infra text accompanying notes 334, 337, 341, 347, 355 (arguing the GC
should have invalidated some of the policy provisions because the provisions violate the GC’s
general test for social media policies).
17
See infra text accompanying notes 314–325, 331–355 (describing the off-duty
protection statutes, which the approved policy failed to incorporate, and the inconsistencies in
the GC’s analysis).
18
See infra text accompanying notes 315–329 (describing off-duty protection
statutes and recent social media legislation).
19
See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing the approved policy’s
failures and inconsistencies).
20
See infra text accompanying note 274 (stating the approved policy’s
deficiencies can be fixed by referring to the GC’s general test for social media policies).
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This comment provides solutions to the approved policy’s
inadequacies and inconsistencies based on careful analysis of the GC’s
policy provision evaluations and review of relevant case law and GC advice
memos. 21 Employers must tailor their social media policies to their
particular industry and use the approved policy only as a guide as its
application is limited to a specific industry. 22 The GC provides reliable
guidance to employers by consistently rejecting the use of a savings clause
and consistently treating limiting language favorably. 23 Thus, when
reviewing an employer’s policy, employers can reasonably infer the GC will
favorably view use of limiting language and absence of a savings clause.24
However, the GC’s inconsistency in evaluating specific policy provisions
means employers must look to previous memos and the approved policy
language to craft lawful policy provisions.25 Employers must also recognize
that the approved policy does not reference all the important areas employers
need to consider, such as off-duty protection statutes, recent social media
legislation, unlawful surveillance restrictions, and notifying employees of
how the policy is monitored and enforced.26 The areas the policy fails to
address warrant consideration and must be incorporated into an employer’s
social media policy. 27 Finally, this comment encourages employers to
conduct an investigation before terminating an employee for online conduct
in violation of an employer’s social media policy because the employer risks
liability for terminating an employee lawfully engaged in protected concerted
activity.28
The approved policy is an excellent resource for employers, but as
this comment argues below, it can only serve as a template because the
21
See infra text accompanying notes 360–362 (describing recommended changes
employers must make to correct the deficiencies of the approved policy).
22
See infra text accompanying notes 364–368 (detailing why employers need to
tailor the policy to their specific industry because this policy was drafted for a specific
company within a specific industry).
23
See infra text accompanying notes 369–377 (analyzing the tests employers can
reasonably rely on because the GC is consistent in its favorable treatment of limiting language
and its rejection of a savings clause).
24
See infra text accompanying notes 369–373 (arguing the GC’s analysis of
limiting language and absence of a savings clause are features employers can reasonably rely
on when drafting a social media policy).
25
See infra text accompanying notes 374–390 (referring to the advice memos and
previous policies to correct the errors of the approved policy when the GC is inconsistent in its
analysis).
26
See infra text accompanying notes 314–330, 391–398, 403 (describing areas
the approved policy fails to incorporate).
27
See supra note 26 and accompanying text (arguing the approved policy’s
failures, in addition to omitted provisions, require employers to diligently correct the mistakes
of the approved policy and draft additional provisions to ensure their policy is
comprehensive).
28
See infra text accompanying notes 408–410 (recommending employers
conduct an investigation before terminating an employee for violations of an employer’s
social media policy).
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interplay between social media, employers, and employees continues to
grow, and many areas are left unaddressed. 29 Properly protecting an
employer’s business through a valid social media policy, while recognizing
employees’ lawful rights, requires a clear understanding of the current state
of the law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Protected Concerted Activity under Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)
Employers must understand the history and interpretation of the
NLRA in order to understand how the GC applies the law to social media.
The history of employees engaging in concerted activity to improve their
working conditions is extensive and ever-evolving, beginning with Section 7
of the NLRA, which provides protection to employees engaging in concerted
activities.30 NLRA gives employees the right to work in concert for mutual
aid and protection to improve the terms and conditions of employment. 31
Employees’ guaranteed right to engage in concerted activities is protected
from an employer’s interference, restraint, or coercion because the
employer’s unlawful interference is an unfair labor practice.32
In Meyers Industries v. NLRB, the NLRB created the Meyers test to
define concerted activity, and the test is cited throughout the GC social
media memos.33 The NLRB defined activity as concerted when an employee
acts with the authority of other employees or on behalf of those employees,
and the employee is not acting solely for himself.34 The NLRB reasoned that
concerted activity included circumstances where individual employees seek
to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action, including when employees
29
See infra text accompanying notes 399–407 (describing areas of the law that
are left unresolved).
30
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (providing that the
NRLA covers employers whose business affects interstate commerce with the exception of
agricultural and domestic workers, independent contractors, employees of a parent or a
spouse, and supervisors).
31
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to engage in . . .
concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”).
32
29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
33
See Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to All
Reg’l Dirs., Officers-In-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum 12–31, Report of the
Acting Gen. Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases (Jan. 24, 2012), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567 [hereinafter Jan. 2012 NLRB
Memo]; Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to All Reg’l Dirs.,
Officers-In-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum 11–74, Report of the Acting Gen.
Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases (Aug. 18, 2011), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743 [hereinafter Aug. 2011 NLRB
Memo].
34
Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 4.
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discuss concerns together prior to any specific plan to engage in group
action. 35 The NLRB found an individual’s actions may receive protection
under the NLRA if the employee can show the actions or concerns are the
logical outgrowth of other employees’ apprehensions.36 However, the NLRB
excludes protection under concerted activity when the individual acts for his
or her own benefit.37
Washington Aluminum Company changed labor relations and how
employers responded to employee actions by expanding the NLRA to nonunion settings. 38 In Washington Aluminum Company, seven employees
walked off the job because they could not work in the shop due to its cold
temperature, and previous complaints to management had proved
unsuccessful.39 The employees were discharged for violating the company
policy that forbade leaving the shop without permission.40 The Court found
the employees engaged in concerted activity because they worked together to
improve their working conditions. 41 The Court reasoned the policy was
unlawful because the policy prohibited employees from engaging in
concerted activities to improve working conditions and violated the
employees’ rights.42 The employees’ right to engage in protected concerted
activity was of paramount importance because “[t]hey had no bargaining
representative and, in fact, no representative of any kind to present their
grievances to their employer. Under these circumstances, they had to speak
for themselves as best they could.”43 The impact of Washington Aluminum
Company expanded the NLRA’s coverage for employees’ protected
concerted activities to include non-union settings, resulting in the NLRA’s
application to unionized workplaces, workplaces engaged in a union
campaign, and non-union workplaces.44
35

Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda
Pate Jones, Reg’l Dir. of Region 27, Pub. Serv. Credit Union, No. 27-CA-21923, 2011 WL
5822506, at 3 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.
aspx/09031d45806fc018 [hereinafter Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo].
36
NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, 53 F.3d 261, 265 (1995).
37
Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo, supra note 35, at 4.
38
See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962); see also Robert
Sprague, Facebook Meets The NLRB: Employee Online Communications And Unfair Labor
Practices, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 959 (2012) [hereinafter Sprague, Employee Online
Communications]; Ann C. McGinley & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel, Beyond the Water
Cooler: Speech and the Workplace in an Era of Social Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
75, 88 (2012) (stating that many employers believe the NRLA only governs behavior in
private unionized workplaces or workplaces in the midst of union drives).
39
Wash. Aluminum Co.. 370 U.S. at 10–11. The employees worked in the shop
producing aluminum products. The shop was not insulated and the only source of heat was an
oil furnace in the adjoining building. On the day in question, the oil furnace was broken and
the temperatures were 11 degrees with a high of 22 with unusually high winds. Id.
40
Id. at 16.
41
Id. at 14.
42
Id. at 14–15.
43
Id. at 14.
44
McGinley & McGinley-Stempel, supra note 38, at 88.
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The GC applies the NLRB’s protected concerted activity precedent
to the social media context and periodically issues summary memoranda of
the cases the GC reviews.45 The GC recently released a memo specifically
analyzing six unlawful social media policy provisions and detailing why the
policy provisions are overly broad.46 The GC also analyzed Wal-Mart’s (a
national corporation) social media policy and concluded all its provisions
were lawful.47 The approved policy acts as a template for employers seeking
to draft employment policies with lawful social media provisions; however,
employers are encouraged to exercise great care in drafting a social media
policy and to conduct an investigation into any employees’ conduct to
determine whether the employees’ actions are protected concerted activity
before concluding disciplinary action, including termination, is warranted.48
B. The GC’s Tests for Lawful Social Media Policies
Employers are encouraged to learn the contours of the term
“concerted activity” to avoid drafting social media policies that ultimately

45

See Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33; Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra
note 33; Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to All Reg’l Dirs.,
Officers-In-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum 12–59, Report of the Acting Gen.
Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases (May 30, 2012), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd [hereinafter May 2012 NLRB
Memo]; see also The General Counsel, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/whowe-are/general-counsel (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (describing the GC as independent from the
NLRB and acting as the agency’s top investigative and prosecutorial position which includes
exercising supervisory authority over all the NLRB’s field offices. The GC guides policy by
issuing complaints, seeking injunctions, and enforcing the Board’s decisions).
46
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 2–20; see also Kevin Bogardus,
Obama Nominates NLRB Members Who Were Ruled Invalid in Court, (Feb. 13, 2013, 12:47
PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1007-other/282833-obama-re-nominates-nlrbmembers-who-were-ruled-invalid-in-court (stating that the D.C. Circuit Court invalidated
Obama’s recess appointments to the NLRB, and stating lawmakers are challenging the
NLRB’s decisions since January 2012, including the social media memo with the approved
policy provision. Whether the social media memo will survive the challenge or whether the
decisions will be adopted by the new appointees is unknown).
47
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 20–24; see also Advice
Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Chip Harrell, Reg’l Dir. of
Region 11, Walmart, No. 11-CA-067171, at 1 (May 30, 2012), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/11-CA-067171.
48
Ariana Green, Using Social Networking To Discuss Work: NLRB Protection
for Derogatory Employee Speech and Concerted Activity, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 837, 887
(2012); see also Christopher J. Pyles, NLRB General Counsel Summarizes 3rd Social Media
Guidance Memo, 17 No. 7 N.H. EMP. L. LETTER 1, 1 (2012) (reminding employers the
approved policy is a helpful guide, but drafting a social media policy requires a great deal of
care); Susan C. Hudson & Karla K. Roberts (Camp), Drafting and Implementing an Effective
Social Media Policy, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 767, 795 (2012) (stating an employer must
take the time to investigate any alleged violations of a social media policy).
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violate employees’ rights to engage in such activity.49 Employers must also
learn the GC’s test for determining whether a policy provision violates
employee rights. 50 The GC applies a two-prong inquiry when reviewing
employers’ social media policies.51 Under the first prong of the inquiry, the
GC evaluates whether the provision explicitly restricts protected concerted
activities.52 If the policy expressly restricts protected concerted activities, the
policy is invalid. The second prong of the inquiry is reached if the provision
does not explicitly restrict the activities but: (1) employees may reasonably
construe the language to prohibit protected concerted activity; (2) the rule
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule was applied to
restrict the exercise of concerted activity.53 The GC deems a policy unlawful,
under the second prong of the inquiry, when the ambiguous language may
reasonably be construed to prohibit protected concerted activity because it is
not clarified by sufficiently limiting language.54 Using the two-prong inquiry,
the GC found an entire social media policy lawful because it did not
explicitly restrict concerted activities and, according to the GC, was written
in such a way that employees would not reasonably construe the policy
language to include protected concerted activity.55
C. The GC’s Approved Policy Addresses Many Inadequacies of Previously
Invalidated Provisions.
The GC’s approved policy attempts to address inadequacies of
employers’ invalid social media policies. 56 The policy begins with a
“guidelines” section to notify employees that engaging in any conduct
covered by the social media policy may result in disciplinary action or
termination, provided the employee’s actions adversely affect the employee’s
job performance, the performance of co-workers, or organizations or
individuals affiliated with the employer.57 The policy goes on to include a
“Be Respectful,” provision just like other policies have attempted to

49
See Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 779–80 (stating public and private
employers must grant unionized and non-unionized employees the unequivocal right to
engage in concerted activity).
50
See id. at 780 (explaining that the GC released a memorandum detailing what
the GC considered “protected concerted activity” in the social media context).
51
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 3.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 20.
56
Id. at 2.
57
See May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 22 (“Keep in mind that any of
your conduct that adversely affects your job performance, the performance of fellow
associates or otherwise adversely affects members, customers, suppliers, people who work on
behalf of [Employer] or [Employer’s] legitimate business interests may result in disciplinary
action up to and including termination.”).

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/8

10

Considine: Workplace Social Media Policies

2013]

WORKPLACE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES

527

incorporate.58 The policy language requires employees to always be fair and
courteous to fellow co-workers, customers, members, suppliers, or thirdparties working on behalf of the employer. 59 The policy language also
encourages employees to utilize the open door policy to resolve work related
disputes, but does not prevent employees from posting criticisms online;
however, employees are precluded from posting criticisms or complaints in
the form of statements, photographs, video, or audio that may be construed
as malicious, obscene, threatening, intimidating, harassing, disparaging or
defamatory to customers, co-workers, and third-parties working on behalf of
the employer. 60 The policy includes examples of offensive posts, such as
“posts meant to intentionally harm someone’s reputation” and posts about a
person’s sex, creed, religion, or disability that contribute to a hostile work
environment.61
The approved policy language also instructs employees to be
completely accurate and honest when posting online. 62 For example,
employees are required to always be honest and accurate when posting
information or news, and quickly correct any mistakes. 63 In the same
provision requiring honesty and accuracy, the employer reminds employees
the internet archives almost everything, and therefore even deleted posts may
be recovered. 64 Employees are further instructed never to post any
information the employee knows to be false or misleading information about
the employer, associates, or third-parties working on behalf of the
employer.65
58

Id.
Id.
60
Id. at 22–23. The policy language states:
[K]eep in mind that you are more likely to resolve work-related
complaints by speaking directly with your co-workers or by utilizing our
Open Door Policy than by posting complaints to a social media outlet.
Nevertheless, if you decide to post complaints or criticism, avoid using
statements, photographs, video or audio that reasonably could be viewed
as malicious, obscene, threatening or intimidating, that disparage
customers, members, associates or suppliers, or that might constitute
harassment or bullying.
59

Id.

61
See id. at 23 (“Examples of such conduct might include offensive posts meant
to intentionally harm someone’s reputation or posts that could contribute to a hostile work
environment on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion, or any other status protected by law
or company policy.”).
62
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45 at 23. One policy provision heading is
“Be Honest and Accurate.” Id.
63
See id. (“Make sure you are always honest and accurate when posting
information or news, and if you make a mistake, correct it quickly.”).
64
See id. (“Remember that the Internet archives almost everything; therefore,
even deleted postings can be
searched.”).
65
See id. (“Never post any information or rumors that you know to be false about
[Employer], fellow associates, members, customers, suppliers, people working on behalf of
[Employer] or competitors.”).
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The GC provided some guidance by explaining why the “Be
Respectful” provision of the approved policy is lawful.66 First, the GC noted
the “Be Respectful” provision could be overly broad, but did not violate the
GC’s two-prong inquiry because the policy contained sufficiently limiting
language to exclude protected concerted activity.67 Secondly, a reasonable
employee is not likely to read the “Be Respectful” provision as interfering
with protected concerted activity.68
The GC’s analysis of the approved social media policy also
addresses employers’ trade secret and confidential information concerns.69
The approved policy requires employees maintain confidential or private
information and trade secrets.70 In addition, the approved provision provides
examples of trade secrets and additional information that an employee may
not post.71 The approved policy also requires employees to respect financial
disclosure laws and addresses recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
regulations.72
The GC provides minimal guidance explaining why the trademark
and confidential information provisions are lawful.73 First, the GC finds the
trade secret policy provision lawful because employees do not have a
protected right to disclose trade secrets. 74 Second, the GC found
66
See id. at 20 (“[W]e concluded the Employer’s revised social media policy is
not ambiguous because it provides sufficient examples of prohibited conduct . . . .”).
67
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 20.
68
See id. (“In certain contexts the rule’s exhortation to be respectful and ‘fair and
courteous’ in the posting of comments, complaints, photographs, or videos could be overly
broad. The rule, however, provides sufficient examples of plainly egregious so that employees
would not reasonably construe the rule to prohibit [protected concerted activity].”).
69
See id. at 23 (describing the heading of the policy provision “Post Only
Appropriate and Respectful Content”).
70
See id. (“Maintain the confidentiality of [Employer] trade secrets and private or
confidential information.”).
71
See id. (“Trade secrets may include information regarding the development of
systems, processes, products, know-how, and technology. Do not post internal reports,
policies, procedures or other internal business-related confidential communications.”).
72
See id. (“It is illegal to communicate or give a ‘tip’ on inside information to
others so that they may buy or sell stocks or securities. Such online conduct may also violate
the Insider Trading Policy.”). The provision further states:
Do not create a link from your blog, website or other social networking
site to a [Employer] website without first identifying yourself as a
[Employer] associate. Express only your personal opinions. Never
represent yourself as a spokesperson for [Employer]. If [Employer] is a
subject of the content you are creating, be clear and open about the fact
that you are an associate and make it clear that your views do not
represent those of [Employer] . . . . If you do publish a blog or a post
online related to the work you do or subjects associated with [Employer],
make it clear that you are not speaking on behalf of [Employer]. It is best
to include a disclaimer such as “The postings on this site are my own and
do not necessarily reflect the views of [Employer].”
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 23.
73
Id. at 20.
74
Id.
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“confidential information” is accompanied by sufficiently limiting examples
to exclude protected concerted activity.75
The GC does not provide any guidance regarding why the complete
restriction on social media at work is lawful. 76 The employer explicitly
prohibits employees from using social media during work time or on work
equipment without authorization.77 The employer also prohibits employees
from using work email addresses to register for personal social media use.78
Until the GC provides firm policy guidance on this issue, employers may
have to rely on the sparse case law and scholarly commentary.79
D. Unlawful Social Media Policy Provisions Prompting the Release of an
Approved Policy for Guidance
The GC issued two previous summary memoranda including
discussions of social media cases and social media policies.80 The memos
show a pattern of repeated failures by employers to draft lawful policy

75
76

Id.
See id. at 23 (providing no guidance in the “Using Social Media At Work”

provision).

77

See id. (“Refrain from using social media while on work time or on equipment
we provide, unless it is work-related as authorized by your manager or consistent with the
Company Equipment Policy.”).
78
See May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 23 (“Do not use [Employer]
email addresses to register on social networks, blogs or other online tools utilized for personal
use.”).
79
See Hudson & Roberts 774–76 (providing and discussing four options for
employers when regulating social media use); Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social
Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 34 (2011) [hereinafter Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks]
(suggesting employers regulate and monitor employees’ work-related online conduct); see
also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (stating a clearly communicated
policy will help define an employee’s reasonable expectations of privacy when it comes to
monitoring communication activity); Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650,
660 (2010) (examining the reasonable expectations of non-governmental employees when
determining whether a former a non-governmental employee exchanged emails with her
attorney on a work laptop about a discrimination lawsuit. The court noted that the 4th
Amendment search and seizure “reasonable expectation of privacy” does not apply to nongovernmental employees, but stated that common law reasonable expectations of privacy with
regard to attorney-client privilege were applicable); but see Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1109–11 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (declining to follow Stengart when a
non-governmental employee claimed a reasonable expectation of privacy for attorney-client
communications saved and emails sent on a company laptop. The employer’s policy was
broad and applied to all resources used for electronic communications and reserved the
company’s right to access, search, or disclose any file or stored communication. The
employee’s communications were encompassed within the policy, and therefore the employee
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and waived his privilege with regard to the
communications).
80
See generally Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33; Jan. 2012 NLRB
Memo, supra note 33.
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provisions with sufficiently limiting language to exclude protected concerted
activity.81
1. Overly Broad Policy Provisions Deemed Invalid for Lack of Sufficiently
Limiting Language
There are several instances where the GC declares employment
policies invalid when social media provisions explicitly restrict protected
concerted activity. 82 For example, the GC found the following policy
language unlawful: “Don’t release confidential guest, team member or
company information.”83 The GC found the language explicitly prohibited
protected concerted activity because a reasonable employee might interpret
the language as preventing a discussion about employment terms and
conditions with other employees.84 The GC also invalidated a provision for
encouraging employees to use internal procedures, rather than social media,
to resolve their disputes.85 The GC reasoned an employer may suggest an
employee utilize internal procedures to address work conditions; however,
telling employees to utilize internal procedures will likely preclude, or at
least inhibit, employees from engaging in protected activity in alternative
forums like social media.86 In both instances, the GC used the first prong of
the test to determine the policy explicitly restricted protected concerted
activity and struck down the policy as invalid.87

81

See generally Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 34; May 2012 NLRB Memo,
supra note 45 (describing various unlawful and lawful social media policy provisions).
82
See Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33; Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra
note 33; May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45.
83
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 4.
84
Id.; see also Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 13 (declaring a policy
provision unlawful because it failed to use sufficiently limiting language or specific examples
in defining confidential, material, or nonpublic information); Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra
note 33, at 20 (failing provide sufficiently limiting language for “confidential, company, or
team-member information” to exclude protected concerted activity).
85
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 11.
You are encouraged to resolve concerns about work by speaking with coworkers, supervisors, or managers. [Employer] believes that individuals
are more likely to resolve concerns about work by speaking directly with
co-workers, supervisors or other management-level personnel than by
posting complaints on the Internet.[Employer] encourages employees
and other contingent resources to consider using available internal
resources, rather than social media or other online forums, to resolve
these types of concerns.
Id. (alterations in original).
86
Id.
87
See id. (stating the rule had the probable effect of precluding or inhibiting
protected concerted activity. The GC did not discuss whether a reasonable employee may
construe the provision as encompassing protected activity, which is the second step of the
GC’s test for social media policies).
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The GC also provided an example of an invalid, overly broad social
media policy provision that employees might reasonably interpret as
prohibiting protected concerted activity.88 The policy provision attempted to
limit sharing confidential information.89 The policy stated:
You also need to protect confidential information when you
communicate it . . . You should never share confidential
information with another team member unless they have a
need to know the information to do their job . . . Don’t have
conversations regarding confidential information in the
Breakroom or in any other open area. Never discuss
confidential information at home or in public areas.90
The policy language is invalid because employees might reasonably interpret
the provision as restricting employee discussions about the terms and
conditions of employment at home, in the break room, or in other public
places. 91 As such, policy language attempting to limit discussions about
employment terms does not contain sufficiently limiting language and is
declared invalid.92
Even when employers attempt to use limiting language to exclude
protected concerted activity, the GC may decide the qualifying language fails
to exclude protected concerted activity because a reasonable employee may
construe it to include discussions about the terms and conditions of
employment.93 The unlawful policy provision qualified the terms “material
non-public information” and “confidential or proprietary information” as
“company performance, contracts, customer wins or losses, customer plans,
maintenance, shutdowns, work stoppages, cost increases, customer news or
business related travel plans or schedules.” 94 The GC first concluded the
terms “material non-public information” and “confidential or proprietary
information” were too vague, and an employee may reasonably construe the
language as encompassing protected concerted activity. 95 The GC then
moved on to the limiting language and concluded all the terms may
reasonably encompass protected concerted activity because information
about company performance, cost increases, and customer wins or losses is
potentially relevant in union negotiations for employees’ wages and
benefits. 96 The limiting language about contracts, without sufficient
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 4–5.
Id.
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 13.
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clarification, can also be reasonably interpreted to include union contracts.97
Therefore, the entire policy provision, even with limiting language, fails
because the terms lack enough clarity to prevent an employee from
reasonably construing the terms to include protected concerted activity.98
The GC also declared policies requiring complete accuracy in online
posts unlawful because such a requirement is overly broad and fails to
protect employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity. 99
Requiring accuracy in online posts may reasonably relate to employees’
discussion of an employer’s labor policies and an employer’s treatment of
employees. 100 For example, the GC found a motor vehicle manufacturer’s
social media policy to be overly broad where the policy stated, “you must
also be sure that your posts are completely accurate and not misleading.”101
The GC reasoned that an employer’s policy requiring complete accuracy was
unlawful for lack of limiting language excluding protected concerted activity
and may reasonably be interpreted to include discussions about the terms and
conditions of employment.102 Therefore, the GC found the policy provision
overly broad because the policy language encompassed protected concerted
activities.103
2. Overly Broad Policies Preventing Employees From Posting Music,
Photos, or Videos with an Employer’s Logo Violate Employees’ Rights to
Engage in Protected Concerted Activity.
The GC finds employment policies unlawful when an employee may
reasonably interpret the language to restrict the employee’s ability to post
photos, music, or videos to the internet.104 For example, unlawful policies
include those prohibiting employees from posting images, music, video,
quotes, or the personal information of others without the owner’s consent
and assurances the content may legally be shared.105 Unlawful policies also

97

Id. at 12.
Id.
99
Id. at 6–7.
100
Id. at 6.
101
Id.
102
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 6–7. The NRLA does protect
criticisms and discussions about an employer’s employment terms and conditions, but the
NRLA does not extend protections to employees who post maliciously false information. Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 7; see also Jan 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 14 (describing an
invalid policy prohibiting use of the company name or company logo without permission);
Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 6, 22 (declaring a policy invalid for restricting
employees from posting images depicting themselves and the company in any media,
including the internet, in company uniform or corporate logo and declaring a policy
prohibiting the posting of images with the company logo or company store).
105
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 7 (“The Employer’s policy also
unlawfully prohibits employees from posting photos, music, videos, and the quotes and
98
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include those forbidding employees from using an employer’s logos or
trademarks. 106 Both provisions are unlawful because employees may
interpret the provisions as prohibiting posting images or video of concerted
activity.107 To illustrate, an employee may lawfully post photos or videos of
co-workers with picket signs that contain an employer’s logo as protected
concerted activity. 108 Thus, policy provisions preventing employees from
posting images with an employer’s logo or trademark are invalid because
they explicitly restrict an employee’s ability to engage in protected concerted
activity.109
Even though employers may have a proprietary interest in
trademarks, the GC states that employers’ interests in trademark law are not
impinged by an employee’s use of the logo in protected concerted activity,
such as paper leaflets, cartoons, or picket signs protesting the employment
terms and conditions.110 The GC declares employees’ non-commercial use of
the logos or trademarks cannot be restricted in social media policies,
reasoning the activity does not infringe on the employers’ interests.111 Thus,
the GC finds the employers’ proprietary interests are not placed at risk by the
employees’ non-commercial use of trademarks in connection with concerted
activity.112
3. The Use of a Savings Clause Will Not Cure a Policy’s Ambiguities.
Many employer social media policies contain what has become
known as a “savings clause.”113 In the employment context, a savings clause
is a clause inserted into an employment policy for the purpose of curing
ambiguities in the policy that may result from the intentional use of overly
broad language or boilerplate language to correct unintentionally ambiguous
language. 114 Employers frequently phrase savings clauses to suggest that

personal information of others without obtaining the owner’s permission and ensuring that the
content can be legally shared . . . .”).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.; see also Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 6, 22 (detailing an
employee’s right to carry a picket sign with an employer’s name or wear a t-shirt portraying
the employer’s logo in connection with a protest involving employment terms and conditions).
109
See Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 6, 22 (stating that the policy
provisions violate Section 8(a)(1) of the NRLA because an employer is restricting the
employees’ ability to engage in protected concerted activity).
110
Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 14 (explaining that employers’
interests in trademarks may include the good reputation associated with the mark, the public’s
interest in not being misled as to the product’s source, or the employers’ interest in entering a
related commercial field).
111
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 7.
112
Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 14.
113
See, e.g., id. at 8; May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 9.
114
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 9.
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their policies are being administered in accordance with the NLRA. 115
However, in reality, the policies may not align with the NLRA.116 In fact, the
GC rejects employers’ use of savings clauses for two specific reasons. First,
employees may refrain from engaging in protected concerted activity rather
than determine if his or her conduct is covered.117 Second, the savings clause
is an employer’s attempt to escape the consequences of an overly broad
provision.118
4. The GC Deems Employment Policies Requiring Respect and Prohibiting
Disparaging Remarks as Overly Broad.
Under the NLRA, employers may not restrain employees from
discussing the terms and conditions of employment and overly broad policies
are unlawful when reasonably interpreted to restrain an employee’s right to
engage in protected concerted activity. 119 The GC deems employment
policies requiring respect and prohibiting disparaging remarks as overly
broad.120 An example of an overly broad social media policy prohibiting
disparaging remarks includes the following language: “offensive, demeaning,
abusive, or inappropriate remarks are as out of place online as they are
offline, even if they are unintentional.”121 The GC reasoned the policy failed
for over-breadth because the provision may reasonably be construed to
encompass a broad range of communications, some of which may include
protected criticisms of an employer’s labor policies or work conditions.122

115

Id. The savings clause stated that the “[p]olicy will be administered in
compliance with applicable laws and regulations (including Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act).” Id.
116
See id. (explaining that employers cannot rely on the savings clause to cure any
ambiguities within the policy).
117
Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle
Kentov, Reg’l Dir. of Region 12, Flagler Hospital, No. 12-CA-27031, 2011 WL 5115074, at
5 (May 10, 2011), available at http:// mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx
/09031d45806bab9c.
118
See generally May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 9, 12 (rejecting two
social media policies with savings clauses); Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 8
(rejecting the use of a savings clause).
119
See Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 12 (describing as invalid a
policy provision informing employees they are subject to discipline for inappropriate
discussions about the company, management, and/or co-workers because the provision may
restrict protected concerted activity).
120
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 8.
121
Id. See also Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 7–8 (declaring a policy
invalid for requiring employees to discuss terms and conditions of employment in an
appropriate manner, but failing to define appropriate with sufficiently limiting language or
specific examples); Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 12 (declaring a provision
invalid for prohibiting inappropriate discussions because it lacked sufficiently limiting
language to exclude protected concerted activity).
122
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 8.
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The GC also deems provisions requiring employees to adopt a
friendly, professional tone while conversing online as overly broad because
such provisions are reasonably construed to include protected concerted
activity.123 For example, a policy was invalid because it instructed employees
to stay away from objectionable or inflammatory statements, such as politics
or religion.124 The GC analogized discussions about politics and religion to
discussions about unionism or working conditions, finding both contain the
same potential to become heated. 125 Preventing employees from posting
objectionable or inflammatory comments may be construed to limit heated
discussions about unionism or working conditions.126 The policy was also
invalid because the provision did not contain sufficient examples of what
types of communication constitute “objectionable” or “inflammatory,” and
thus employees may reasonably have construed this provision to include
protected concerted activities.127
In addition to the policy language, the GC evaluates the context
surrounding the conversation giving rise to the disparaging remarks to
determine whether the employees’ conversation may reasonably encompass
concerted activity. 128 For example, three hospital employees posted
disparaging remarks regarding patients and the employees’ willingness to
provide patient care. 129 The GC did not find the employees engaged in
protected concerted activity, reasoning the postings were not related to
employment terms and conditions because the employees suggested they
may not provide appropriate care to the employer’s patients.130
E. Surveillance in Violation of the NLRA
Under NLRA Section 8(a)(1), an employer must not give the
impression it is engaging in surveillance of concerted activity because
123
Id. at 10. One invalid provision stated “[a]dopt a friendly tone when engaging
online. Don’t pick fights. . . . Remember to communicate in a professional tone. . . .” Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.; see also Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel
to Jonathan B. Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir. of Region 34, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., No. 34CA-12576, at 3–5, 9 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.
aspx/09031d458055b9c4 (stating an employee was denied union representation and later
proceeded to call her boss a “dick” and a “scumbag “on Facebook and the GC found this
concerted activity because it related to terms and conditions of employment).
126
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 10.
127
Id.
128
Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Director
J. Michael Lightner, Reg’l Dir. of Region 22, MONOC, No. 22-CA-29008, et al., 2010 WL
4685855, at 2 (May 5, 2010), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.
aspx/09031d45803f7e3b.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 5 (explaining some of the postings may have included protected activity,
but the postings creating the grounds for termination did not relate to the terms and conditions
of employment).
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surveillance constitutes unlawful interference by preventing employees from
feeling free to participate in union activities and causing employees to fear
management is watching the employees’ activities. 131 An employee’s
activities are under surveillance when the employer reveals specific
information about protected concerted activity that is generally not known,
and the employer does not reveal its source.132 However, no impression of
surveillance is created when the employer explains the information came
from a co-worker and was unsolicited by the employer.133
Specific to the social media context, unlawful surveillance does not
exist when an employer’s agent has been invited to observe an employee’s
social media page, when the activities are not related to a union or for mutual
aid and protection, and when the employer did not direct the surveillance or
the employer did not make the surveillance its express purpose.134 Employer
surveillance creates tension in its application to social media because more
employees are “friending” or “connecting” with their bosses on Facebook,
Twitter, and LinkedIn.135 Several cases address this tension.
The GC’s Buel Advice Memo is one illustration of the tension
between an employer’s alleged surveillance and the employee’s suggestion
that he engaged in protected concerted activity.136 In the Buel Advice Memo,
an employee truck driver was friends on Facebook with the employer’s
operations manager.137 The employee’s Facebook post complained about one
of the employer’s dispatcher’s unavailability and unresponsiveness to a road
closure. 138 The employer’s operations manager commented on the
employee’s Facebook post, triggering an exchange of comments between the
employee and operations manager.139 The employee claimed that when he
returned to work, he was stripped of his lead operations status and forced to
resign. 140 The employee contended the employer engaged in unlawful
surveillance by monitoring his Facebook page.141

131

Id.
Id.
133
Id. at 6.
134
Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jane
North, Acting Reg’l Dir. of Region 11, Buel, Inc., No. 11-CA-22936, 2011 WL 3793671, at 4
(July 28, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45805fa7fc
[hereinafter Buel Truck Memo].
135
Sprague, Employee Online Communications, supra note 38, at 957 (suggesting
that “the nature of social media technologies raises new issues of unlawful employer
surveillance”).
136
Buel Truck Memo, supra note 134, at 2; see also Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo,
supra note 33, at 32.
137
Buel Truck Memo, supra note 134, at 2.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. 2–3.
141
Id. at 3.
132
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The GC rejected the employee’s claim and found the employer did
not engage in unlawful surveillance for three reasons.142 The GC did not find
unlawful surveillance in this instance because when the employee “friended”
his supervisor, he invited the operations manager to legally view his page,
the employee’s posts were not union or concerted activity, and the employer
did not request its operations manager to monitor the employee’s Facebook
page.143 The GC’s memo suggests unlawful surveillance may occur if an
employer is on Facebook, or directs an employee or an agent to use
Facebook for the sole purpose of monitoring employees’ postings.144
Another illustration of the tension between employer surveillance
and protected concerted activity involved Intermountain Specialized Abuse
and Treatment Center.145 The employee was a director and therapist at the
Center and led group therapy discussions.146 In response to reports of poor
performance, a supervisor announced at a staff meeting the employee was to
be replaced by another therapist at specific therapy sessions.147 Following the
meeting, the employee posted a status update on her Facebook page stating
she hated staff meetings, prompting a co-worker to comment on her post.148
Fellow co-workers subsequently reported the Facebook posts to
management. 149 Several days later, and after additional reports of poor
performance, the employee was discharged. 150 The employee alleged the
employer engaged in unlawful surveillance of her Facebook page in violation
of her rights.151 The treatment facility responded by arguing the employer did
not engage in unlawful surveillance because the employer’s determination to
142

Id.
Buel Truck Memo, supra note 134, at 3–4 (stating there was no indication the
employee’s gripes were a continuation of concerted activity or sought to induce or prepare for
group action. The GC found the employee expressed his individual gripes and frustration).
144
Id. at 5.
145
Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda
Pate Jones, Reg’l Dir. of Region 27, Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Center, No.
27-CA-065577, 2011 WL 6543306, at 1 (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.
gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458077b79d [hereinafter ISATC Memo]. The therapy center
provides services to families, offenders, and others affected by domestic violence. Id.
146
Id. at 2.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 3. The employee posted, “I hate staff meeting [sic] at work. I feel like I'm
taking crazy pills.” Id. Some co-workers “liked” the comment and the following conversation
ensued with a co-worker:
Co-worker: “Is this where we can complain about work? I was so fried
yesterday . . . that I probably did not make sense.”
Co-worker: “But I'll have what you're having.”
Charging Party: “Yeah, I guess this is the place. You too? I'm done trying
to understand our boss . . . And what is it we do for a living again?”
Co-worker: “yeah the sooner you're done with that the better. We're
therapists.”
ISATC Memo, supra note 145, at 3.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 4.
151
Id. at 1.
143
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terminate the employee could not reasonably have been construed to suggest
the employee’s Facebook page was under surveillance.152
The GC rejected the employee’s argument of unlawful surveillance
because the Facebook posts were presented to management by a co-worker,
and the posts did not involve concerted activity.153 Therefore, the employee’s
termination was lawful and the employer did not engage in unlawful
surveillance.154
A third illustration involved the Public Service Credit Union.155 The
employee was a member service representative and provided customer
service to the credit union’s customers. 156 A customer approached the
employee asking if he could change his PIN at the ATM; the employee
replied it was not possible at that branch, but another ATM ten minutes away
would allow the customer to change his PIN. 157 The customer stated his
intent to drive to Fort Collins, Colorado and asked if that Credit Union’s
ATM would allow the customer to also change his PIN; the employee replied
both ATMs allowed for a PIN change. 158 The employee’s supervisor
approached him later in the day because the customer called complaining
that the employee directed the customer to drive to Fort Collins and the
supervisor requested the employee provide better customer service.159 The
employee posted to his Facebook page a series of negative comments out of
frustration with the customer and with regard to how the supervisor
addressed the issue. 160 The employee was Facebook “friends” with nine
workers and one supervisor, and his Facebook settings made his page only
visible to his Facebook “friends.” 161 Several days after the incident, the
employee was called into a meeting with the Branch Manager and Human
Resources Officer, and the employee was terminated. 162 The Human
Resources Officer showed the employee copies of his Facebook posts but
refused to identify how the employer received the information. 163 The
employee claimed he was unlawfully discharged and that the employer
engaged in unlawful surveillance.164

152

See id. at 3 (stating the employer did not solicit the information).
Id. at 4–6 (stating the employee knew which co-worker presented her Facebook
posts to management. The statements were personal gripes and did not indicate she sought to
induce group action or change anything at work).
154
ISATC Memo, supra note 145, at 4–6.
155
Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo, supra note 35, at 1.
156
Id. at 1.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1–2.
161
Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo, supra note 35, at 1.
162
Id. at 2.
163
Id.
164
Id.
153
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The GC dismissed the employee’s complaint and concluded the
employer did not engage in unlawful surveillance.165 The GC analogized this
case to a previous case where it was found that an employer did not create
the impression of surveillance when the employer mentioned a union website
posting forwarded by an employee and the employer failed to disclose its
source.166 In that case, the website was only accessible to other subscribers,
so the employee could reason another subscriber provided the information to
the employer rather than conclude that the employer had engaged in
surveillance of the website.167 In the Credit Union case, the GC reasoned the
employee’s Facebook postings were only visible to the employee’s Facebook
“friends,” and therefore the information provided to the employer came from
a “friend” rather than through surveillance of the employee’s Facebook
page. 168 Further, the GC dismissed the employer’s failure to identify the
source because the employee’s privacy restrictions allowed the employee to
reason (albeit correctly) that a “friend” supplied a copy of the posting.169
Thus, an employer does not engage in unlawful surveillance and does not
need to reveal its source when an employee’s Facebook privacy settings are
restricted only to friends because the employee can reasonably conclude the
information came from a friend rather than through an employer’s
surveillance.170
1. Invalid Social Media Policies Attempting to Incorporate Rules from
Unlawful Surveillance Advice Memoranda
The GC analyzed, and declared invalid, several specific provisions
of social media policies that attempted to incorporate rules from the advice
memoranda prohibiting employer surveillance.171 One policy the GC found
unlawful specifically stated:
[Employer], like other employers, is making internal social
media tools available to share workplace information within
[Employer]. All employees and representatives who use
these social media tools must also adhere to the following:
[r]eport any unusual or inappropriate internal social media
activity to the system administrator.”172

165

Id. at 1.
Id. at 4; see also Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1275–76
(2005), enforced, 181 F. App'x 85 (2d Cir. 2006).
167
Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo, supra note 35, at 4.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 6–8.
172
Id. at 8 (alterations in original).
166

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

23

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 8

540

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

The GC held the policy language was invalid for encouraging employees to
report to management the union activity of other employees, even though the
provision did not specifically authorize employees to engage in unlawful
surveillance on behalf of the employer.173 The GC reasoned the language was
unlawful because protected concerted activity was discouraged.174
A second policy provision declared invalid by the GC required the
employer’s permission before an employee posts a comment when the
employee is unsure whether the post would violate the employer’s policy.175
Even though the GC did not expressly find the employer’s provision violated
the prohibition on employer surveillance, the GC invalidated the provision,
reasoning that any provision requiring employees to obtain permission before
engaging in protected activity is unlawful.176
A third example of invalid policy language incorporating unlawful
surveillance rules warns employees to “[t]hink carefully about ‘friending’ coworkers . . . on external social networking sites. Communications with coworkers on such sites that would be inappropriate in the workplace are also
inappropriate online, and what you say in your personal social media
channels could become a concern in the workplace.”177 The GC reasoned the
provision was unlawful because the language discouraged communications
among co-workers and interfered with the employees’ right to engage in
protected concerted activities.178
The final example of an unlawful social media policy provision
contained a veiled threat to employees. 179 The policy provision instructed
employees that internal consequences could result from a violation of the
employer’s policies, and consequences could also occur externally with
outside individuals or entities.180 The GC reasoned the social media language
pertaining to internal and external consequences was unlawful because the
provision discouraged online postings that could include protected concerted
activities.181

173

Id. at 9.
Id.
175
Id. at 7.
176
Id.
177
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 8.
178
Id. at 8–9.
179
Id. at 11 (“Remember that there can be consequences to your actions in the
social media world-both internally, if your comments violate [Employer] policies, and with
outside individuals and/or entities.”).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 11–12.
174
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2. Unresolved Issues Concerning an Employee’s Right to Privacy and an
Employer’s Monitoring System
Besides drafting lawful social media policies, one of the biggest
concerns facing employers is enforcement of social media policies.182 Under
the unlawful surveillance standard, an employer cannot monitor and enforce
a policy for illegal or coercive purposes.183 However, what remains unclear is
whether an employer engages in unlawful surveillance if an employee’s
posts become available simply because the employer is a “friend-of-a-friend”
of the employee on Facebook.184 Also, it is unclear whether the employer is
monitoring concerted activity if the employer follows an employee on
Twitter or learns of the information from an employee’s publicly visible
account. 185 Furthermore, the employer may only have a right to monitor
activities for which the employee lacks a reasonable expectation of
privacy.186
F. Social Media Policies, Trade Secrets, Confidential Information and the
NLRA
The GC declares employees do not have a protected right to disclose
trade secrets and confidential information. 187 However, like the concerted
activity provisions, the social media policy must contain sufficiently limiting
language to ensure the provision cannot reasonably be construed to chill
protected concerted activities, outlined by the GC’s test for ambiguity. 188
Such a provision may appear easy to draft, but the GC analyzed several
policy provisions prohibiting disclosure of confidential information and
found each provision unlawful.189
For example, a policy forbidding employees from discussing any
confidential information is overly broad and unlawful because the language
may reasonably be construed to prohibit discussions about the terms and
conditions of employment. 190 A provision stating “[d]on’t release
confidential guest, team member, or company information” is unlawful
182

Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 793.
Id. at 794.
184
Sprague, Employee Online Communications, supra note 38, at 1009.
185
Id. at 1010–11. Robert Sprague suggests that an employer who purposefully
follows an employee on Twitter is engaged in surveillance but this has not been expressly
addressed by the GC. Id.
186
Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 793.
187
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 20.
188
Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 12 (stating a policy provision
incorporating both unprotected conduct (disclosure of trade secrets) and protected conduct
(confidential information) without sufficiently limiting the language is unlawful for
overbreadth).
189
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 4–7.
190
Id. at 4–5.
183
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because the language can reasonably be construed to prohibit employees
from discussing the terms and conditions of employment, which is
considered protected concerted activity.191 The right to engage in concerted
activity is protected by the NLRA, and without sufficiently limiting language
to exclude protected concerted activities, the provision is overly broad and
unlawful.192
Another example of an invalid policy contained language allowing
the release of confidential information on a need to know basis. 193 The
provision stated, “You also need to protect confidential information when
you communicate it. . . . Make sure someone needs to know. You should
never share confidential information with another team member unless they
have a need to know the information to do their job.”194 The GC found this
provision unlawful, reasoning the provision prohibits employees from
engaging in the employees’ right to discuss the terms and conditions of
employment.195
A third employer received partial approval from the GC for a
provision restricting the release of trade secrets and confidential
information.196 The policy stated:
Respect all copyright and other intellectual property laws.
For [Employer’s] protection as well as your own, it is critical
that you show proper respect for the laws governing
copyright, fair use of copyrighted material owned by others,
trademarks and other intellectual property, including
[Employer’s] own copyrights, trademarks and brands. Get
permission before reusing others’ content or images.197
The GC found part of the provision potentially lawful because the
provision urged employees to respect pertinent copyright and intellectual
property laws.198 However, the GC ultimately deemed the provision unlawful
because requiring employees to seek permission may interfere with an
employee’s right to take and post images of a picket line or video of
employees working in unsafe conditions. 199 The employer’s permission
requirement caused the GC to find the entire provision unlawful.200

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 5.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the GC declared a policy provision unlawful because the
term “material non-public information” was overly broad and vague.201 The
GC deemed “material non-public information” overly broad; absent
clarification, the term could reasonably be interpreted to restrict employees’
social media postings about employment terms and conditions.202
Federal agents are reminding employers to consider financial
disclosure laws and employers should anticipate developments in this area
when reviewing social media policies. 203 The FBI announced a specific
taskforce designed to search social media websites in an effort to ferret out
insider trading violations. 204 Present case law does not address whether a
posting via social media qualifies as a whistleblower “report” under federal
or state statutes. 205 Absent clear guidance, employers should evaluate the
employees’ statements and conduct a complete investigation to determine if
the employees’ statements are covered under whistleblower or antiretaliation laws.206
G. Federal Trade Commission Rules, Social Media Policies, and Review
by the GC
The GC lends support to the FTC rules for employers’ product or
services endorsements on the internet.207 Such inter-agency support is critical
because employers risk liability for employees’ violations of the new FTC

201

May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45,Id. at 13.
See id. (stating that the provision is invalid because it contains examples such
as company performance, cost increases, and customer wins or losses that may be relevant to
collective bargaining negotiations and those examples encompass protected concerted
activity).
203
See generally Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, FBI Uses Twitter, Social
Media to Look for Securities Fraud, REUTERS, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/11/26/net-us-investment-summit-fbi-idUSBRE8AP0EX20121126?feedType=
RSS&feedName=technologyNews&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=56505
(stating the FBI views social media as a potential area for securities fraud and is dedicated to
reviewing social media for violations).
204
Id.
205
Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 796; see also Advice Memorandum From
the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Ronald K. Hooks, Reg’l Dir. of Region 26, TAW,
Inc., No. 26-CA-63082, at 1 (Nov. 22, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/
link/document.aspx/09031d4580755f55 (describing an employee post on Facebook alleging
her employer was fraudulent in an audit and the employee was terminated for her social media
statements. GC found the employee did not engage in concerted activity because she was
informed the employer did not engage in fraud; yet, the employee refused to remove the
posting).
206
Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 796.
207
Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17–18 (describing a lawful policy
provision prohibiting publishing of promotional conduct and stating it is lawful because
includes preface and refers to FTC regulations); see also May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note
45, at 16.
202
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rules.208 Employers must ensure employees receive proper notification in the
social media policy detailing how to comply with the FTC guidelines, while
simultaneously ensuring employees will not reasonably construe the policy
language to include protected concerted activity.209
The FTC’s revised rules for internet reviews are contained in the
FTC’s Guide Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising.210 The new rules are intended to protect consumers by creating
guidelines to distinguish employer product or service endorsements from
consumer endorsements.211 Under the FTC’s new guidelines, an employer’s
social media policy must explain how to adhere to the FTC’s new standards
if an employee is using social media to endorse an employer’s products or
services.212 The FTC requires an endorsement to “reflect the honest opinions,
findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.”213 A lawful social media
policy (according to the FTC) requires the employee to disclose any
connection to the employer and use a clear and conspicuous disclaimer.214
The FTC states both the endorser and employer risk liability if the FTC finds
a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act guidelines.215
The GC analyzed two policy provisions attempting to incorporate the
new FTC endorsements, and the GC declared the provisions lawful,
supporting the FTC’s goal of protecting consumers from misrepresented
endorsements.216 The GC reviewed two provisions requiring employees to
abide by the FTC regulations.217 The first policy provision stated: “Unless
you are specifically authorized to do so, you may not: . . . [r]epresent any
opinion or statement as the policy or view of the [Employer] or of any
208

J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Endorsement and
Testimonials Guide at the American Conference Institute’s Regulatory Summit for
Advertisers and Marketers 2– 3 (June 25, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/rosch/090625roschendorsementspeech.pdf.
209
See generally Jan 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17–18, May 2012
NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 16 (discussing two policy provisions addressing promotional
concerns and attempting to draft the provisions in lawful ways so the provisions are not
construed to include protected concerted activity).
210
16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2011).
211
Id.
212
Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 787.
213
16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (2011).
214
See Rosch, supra note 208, at 5–6 (cautioning a blogger to fully disclose he
received a system for free because generally readers will not expect the blogger received the
system in exchange for a review and material relationships between the employer and
endorser must be disclosed).
215
Id. at 2–3.
216
See Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17–18 (describing a policy
provision prohibiting the publishing of promotional conduct that was found lawful because it
included a preface and referred to the FTC regulations); May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note
45, at 16–17 (describing a policy provision requiring employees to use a disclaimer when
posting about the employer as lawful because it protects the employer from unauthorized
postings promoting its products or services).
217
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 15–16.

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/8

28

Considine: Workplace Social Media Policies

2013]

WORKPLACE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES

545

individual in their capacity as an employee or otherwise on behalf of the
[Employer].”218 The second provision stated: “Users may not post anything
on the Internet in the name of [Employer] or in a manner that could
reasonably be attributed to [Employer] without prior written permission from
the President or the President’s designated agent.”219
The GC found both provisions lawful because employees will not
reasonably construe the provisions to limit comments about employee
working conditions or employment. 220 Further, the GC acknowledged that
employers have a legitimate need for such a disclaimer to prevent
unauthorized postings about its products or services. 221 The GC’s finding
provides support for the FTC’s goal of protecting consumers from
misrepresented endorsements. 222 The GC allows social media policies to
prohibit employees from making unauthorized posts about an employer’s
products or services.223
H. Define Use of Social Media During Work Hours
Scholars strongly suggest employers’ policies should define the
scope of social media during work hours and should notify employees
regarding how the policy is enforced.224 An employer’s ability to monitor an
employee’s personal social media use at work is subject to NLRA and offduty protection statutes.225
Recent developments, outside the GC, suggest employee posts on
social media websites may be protected from misuse by an employer’s
monitoring system.226 Colorado, New York, and North Dakota have broad
off-duty protection statutes that provide protection to employees for off-duty
218

Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
220
Id. at 15, 17; see also Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17 (finding a
policy provision lawful when prohibiting employees from posting information related to
“embargoed information” related to launch and release dates and pending reorganization
because employees do not have a protected right to disclose).
221
See May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 15, 17 (paraphrasing the two
policy provisions as notifying employees that only officials designated by the employer have
the authority to speak on behalf of the employer and explaining the GC’s decisions to declare
both policy provisions lawful because employees will not reasonably construe the policy to
prohibit concerted activity, but rather will interpret the language as prohibiting employees
from falsely representing their employer).
222
See Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17–18 (reasoning a policy
provision is lawful for prohibiting publishing of promotional conduct because it includes a
preface and refers to FTC regulations).
223
May 2012 Memo, supra note 45, at 15, 17.
224
See Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 774; Sprague, Invasion of the Social
Networks, supra note 79, at 34 (suggesting employers regulate and monitor employees’ workrelated online conduct).
225
Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 773.
226
See id. at 793 (explaining that courts are not tolerant of an employer’s use of a
monitoring system to access employees’ personal social media absent a work related purpose).
219
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activities.227 Generally, the courts in off-duty protection states do not provide
clear guidance on the breadth or narrowness of some of the statutory terms
when determining whether an employee’s actions are covered.228 Scholars

227

Joseph Lipps, Note, State Lifestyle Statutes and the Blogosphere: Autonomy
For Private Employees in the Internet Age, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 654 (2011); see also N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2009) (“It is the policy of this state to prohibit discrimination . . .
with regard to marriage or public assistance, or participation in lawful activity off the
employer’s premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential
business-related interests of the employer.”); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(b) (McKinney 2009)
(prohibiting discrimination for recreational purposes, which is defined as “any lawful, leisuretime activity, for which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally
engaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies,
exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar material.”); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2010) (“It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment
practice for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee’s
engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours . . .
.”).
228
See Lipps, supra note 227, at 656–61 (2011) (explaining that the Colorado
statute applies only to terminations but other state statutes embrace both terminations and
disciplinary actions). North Dakota’s decision in Fatland v. Quaker State means decreasing
goodwill may be covered by the statute and therefore the statute may be interpreted narrowly,
but later North Dakota courts failed to affirmatively hold that an employee masturbating in a
public stall was outside the confines of the off-duty protection statute, thus suggesting the
court may take a broad view when interpreting the statute. Id. See also Marsh v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1461, 1464 (D. Colo. 1997) (when an employee sought relief
after being terminated for writing a letter to the editor criticizing the employer’s hiring
practices, the Colorado court interpreted “bona fide occupational requirement” to include a
duty of loyalty and failed to provide the employee relief); Watson v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo.,
207 P.3d 860, 863–64 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) (restricting the “duty of loyalty” to the facts in
Marsh by indicating that no other Colorado court has followed Marsh’s decision, and by
taking a broad view of the statute, finding it applied to all off-duty activities, even if related to
work); Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F. 3d 1070, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 1995) (arguing that
Fatland’s discussions about opening up a lube business represented a violation of Quaker’s
policy requiring specific employees to disclose potential conflicts of interests with Quaker,
and, as such, Fatland’s job of marketing Quaker’s products represented a conflict of interest
even though the activities occurred after hours and Fatland was not protected by North
Dakota’s off-duty protection statute); Kolb v. Camilleri, No. 02-CV-0117A(Sr), 2008 WL
3049855, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) (concluding that picketing does not fall within the
definition of “recreational activities” under the New York off-duty protection statute);
McCavitt v. Swiss Reins Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2001) (McLaughlin, J.,
concurring) (suggesting the Judge believes the “recreational activities” should be construed
broadly by stating “[i]t is repugnant to our most basic ideals in free society that an employer
can destroy an individual’s livelihood on the basis of whom he is courting, without first
having to establish that the employee’s relationship is adversely affecting the employer’s
business interests”); State of New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 A.D.2d 150, 152–53
(concluding that “dating” is not covered under “recreational activities” in New York’s offduty protection statute); but see a dissenting opinion:
In my view, given the fact that the Legislature's primary intent in enacting
Labor Law § 201-d was to curtail employers' ability to discriminate on the
basis of activities that are pursued outside of work hours, and that have no
bearing on one's ability to perform one's job, and concomitantly to
guarantee employees a certain degree of freedom to conduct their lives as
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suggest employees may receive some protection for social networking
activities, depending on how the courts interpret each individual statute.229 In
addition, six states, California, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, and
New Jersey, enacted legislation preventing an employer from requiring an
employee to disclose their username or password to social media accounts.230
There is no general protection for off-duty conduct except for specific states’
statutory provisions, and Montana’s requirement that employee termination
be for good cause. 231 How the courts will address policy provisions
incorporating termination for good cause, off-duty protection statutes, or
social media legislation is unclear because the courts have not addressed any
employer’s social media policy provisions applying a state’s employee
protection statutes or the newly enacted social media legislation.232
In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court followed Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion from a previous case to determine whether a
government employer’s search of an employee’s pager messages was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 233 The Court first evaluated the
operational realities of the workplace in order to determine whether an
employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated by an employer’s
monitoring efforts. 234 The “operational realities” analysis included an
evaluation of whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 235 If the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
Court moved to the second evaluation—the reasonableness under all the
they please during nonworking hours, the narrow interpretation adopted
by the majority is indefensible.
Wal-Mart Stores, 207 A.D.2d at 153 (Yesawich Jr., J., dissenting).
229
See Lipps, supra note 227, at 664 (stating that in Colorado, a court would likely
find an employee’s blog or social networking activity is neither a conflict of interest nor
related to employment responsibilities, but the future effect of the statute depends on whether
there is still an implied “duty of loyalty.” In North Dakota, given the unwillingness of the
Court to affirmatively hold masturbating in a private stall falls outside the confines of the offduty protection statute, a North Dakota court will likely protect less offensive acts like
blogging or Facebook posts. Based on the New York courts’ analysis of off-duty protection
statutes, it is possible that internet activities are covered by the statute’s term “hobbies,” but
there exists disagreement in whether the courts should interpret the statute narrowly or
broadly).
230
Employer Access to Social Media Username and Passwords: 2012 Legislation,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx [hereinafter Employer
Access].
231
Lipps, supra note 227, at 654–55; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903 (2009).
Montana is the only state that requires termination for “good cause,” meaning a reasonable
job-related dismissal for failure to satisfactorily perform job duties. Lipps, supra note 227, at
649–50; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5).
232
See Lipps, supra note 227, at 649–53 (explaining that there is little precedent
applying these statutes to internet activity); Employer Access, supra note 230 (explaining that
the legislation was released in 2012 and only some states have enacted it).
233
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010).
234
Id.
235
Id.
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circumstances of the employer’s intrusion for non-investigatory, workrelated purposes, and investigations for work-related misconduct.236
The Court went on to suggest the plurality opinion used to decide
this case may not have been the correct approach, and the Court was
reluctant to reach a broad holding implicating future cases that may not be
decided.237 The Court further noted that many employers expect or at least
tolerate personal internet use on employer equipment.238 The Court stated a
clearly communicated, robust, and specific social media policy is a
mechanism employers must use to confine employees’ reasonable
expectations of privacy.239
Scholars suggest governmental and non-governmental employers
have the option to elect one of three provisions to satisfy the Quon test.240
First, employers may elect to ban all personal use of social media during
working hours.241 Employers face two challenges with an outright ban on
social media. 242 First, enforcing and monitoring a ban on social media is
expensive. 243 Second, employers must prove to a court the operational
realities of the workplace require that employees do not use social media at
work.244 If the policy and the operational realities are inconsistent, employers
risk the policy being nullified. 245 Some agencies and major companies
236

Id.
Id. at 2630. The Court stated that, even if it was certain the plurality opinion
was the correct approach, the Court cannot predict how employees’ privacy expectations will
be shaped by changes in society and a broad holding may have unforeseen implications. Id.
238
Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2629.
239
See id. at 2630 (stating that clearly communicated policies related to electronic
communications will help shape the reasonable expectations of government employees); see
also Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 660 (2010) (looking at the
reasonable expectations of non-governmental employees when determining whether a former
a non-governmental employee exchanged emails with her attorney on a work laptop about a
discrimination lawsuit. The court noted that the 4th Amendment search and seizure
“reasonable expectation of privacy” does not apply to non-governmental employees, but
common law reasonable expectations of privacy with regard to attorney-client privilege were
applicable); but see Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1109–11 (W.D.
Wash. 2011) (declining to follow Stengart when a non-governmental employee claimed a
reasonable expectation of privacy for attorney-client communications saved and emails sent
on a company laptop. The employer’s policy was broad and applied to all resources used for
electronic communications, and reserved the company’s right to access, search, or disclose
any file or stored communication. The employee’s communications were encompassed within
the policy, and therefore the employee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and
waived the privilege with regard to the communications).
240
See Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 774–76 (describing three options
employers may choose from).
241
Id. at 774.
242
See id. (stating the policy must be strictly enforced, the employer must strictly
monitor employee use of social media, and employer must prove to the court it is within the
operational realities of the workplace that employees do not use social media).
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 773.
237
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continue to ban social media use, although most employers have elected not
to completely ban social media use in their social media policies.246
The second option strikes a middle ground by allowing personal use
of social media, but only at specific times and places.247 Allowing restricted
use of social media reflects the actual use of personal social media by
employees and attempts to balance it with the company’s legitimate business
interests. 248 Cases reviewed by the GC indicate employees regularly use
smartphones or other devices to access social media during work hours and
suggest employers currently attempt to balance employees’ social media use
by limiting the use to breaks. 249 Companies allowing for restricted use of
social media accept employees’ use of social media during working hours,
but limit its use to breaks or prohibit its use during customer interactions.250
The third option requires employers to allow employees unrestricted
use of personal social media during work hours.251 Encouraging social media
use is beneficial because of increased company exposure through employees’
posts, tweets, or other social media use (subject to FTC regulations), and
allowing social media eliminates the expenses involved with implementing
and monitoring a social media policy.252 However, by allowing unrestricted
social media use during work hours, the employer risks the loss of employee
productivity in the workplace.253 Additionally, failure to monitor employees’
social media use may expose the employer to liability, for example, if an
employee fails to use a disclaimer for an FTC endorsement.254
The GC has not specifically analyzed any policies restricting,
prescribing, or prohibiting the personal use of social media during working

246

See Lothar Determan, Social Media @ Work—Checklist for Global Business,
BLOOMBERG SOC. MEDIA L. & POL’Y REP. (May 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/XLJOEFG5GVG0 (stating larger companies are banning social media at work).
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
See Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to
Wayne Gold, Reg’l Dir. of Region 5, Children’s National Medical Center, No. 05-CA-36658,
2011 WL 6009620, at 1 (Nov. 14, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/
link/document.aspx/09031d45806fc01d (describing an employee using her iPhone during
working hours to post a complaint about a co-worker); Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note
33, at 2 (describing an employee using her phone on her lunch break to post an expletive with
the store name on Facebook).
250
See, e.g., Social Networking Policy and Guidelines, U. OF WASH. SCH. OF
NURSING (Sept. 26, 2011), http://nursing.uw.edu/sites/default/files/files/SoN-SocialNetworking-Policy.pdf.
251
See Susan Rush, How Zappos Makes Social Media a Part of its Company
Culture, SMARTBLOG ON SOC. MEDIA (Jan. 10, 2011), http://smartblogs.com/socialmedia/2011/01/10/how-zappos-makes-social-media-a-part-of-its-company-culture (quoting a
Zappos executive who stated, “[o]ur social media policy is be yourself and don’t be stupid”).
252
Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 774.
253
Id.
254
Id.
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hours.255 Scholars, however, continue to provide guidance for employers on
this issue.256 Regardless of the policy adopted, employers must provide clear
notice to employees specifying an employer’s stance on social media.257 The
clear notice defines the employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy and
an employee’s expectation is important because it is one of the factors a
court may use to evaluate whether the employees’ rights are violated by an
employer’s monitoring system. 258 The employer must also consistently
monitor and enforce its policy to prevent courts from nullifying the policy’s
enforcement.259
Finally, employers are encouraged to notify employees that the same
anti-harassment and anti-discrimination standards in the workplace apply to
online conduct if it creates a hostile work environment, regardless of whether
it occurred during working hours or off-duty. 260 Many states are adopting
statutes prohibiting specific types of conduct.261 Employers must remember
these provisions are subject to employees’ rights to discuss employment
terms and conditions until the GC analyzes a policy provision and provides
more detailed guidance.262

255

See generally Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33; Jan. 2012 NLRB
Memo, supra note 33; May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45.
256
See, e.g., Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 773– 76; Sprague, Invasion of
the Social Networks, supra note 79, at 34.
257
See Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks, supra note 79, at 34 (stating an
employee is on actual notice when an employee acknowledges receiving an employee manual
with a clear provision stating the employer is monitoring computer activity).
258
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (stating a clearly
communicated policy will help shape an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
259
Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 774– 75. The policy is only as good as its
enforcement and failure to consistently enforce the policy may render it ineffective when the
employer attempts to enforce it against a specific employee. Id.
260
See id. (stating the policy should include a provision prohibiting harassment
and discrimination through social media when it creates a hostile work environment); see also
Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 164 N.J. 38, 45 (2000) (holding the employer may be directly
liable if the employer fails to remedy harassment of a co-worker after the employer was put on
notice and the harassment was sufficiently connected to the workplace).
261
See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07(b)(3) (West 2011) (“A person
commits an offense if the person sends an electronic mail, instant message, text message, or
similar communication that references a name, domain address, phone number, or other item
of identifying information belonging to any person . . . with the intent to harm or defraud any
person”). Delaware also enacted a specific statute:
A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or
alarm another person . . . [that person] [c]ommunicates with a person by
telephone, telegraph, mail or any other form of written or electronic
communication in a manner which the person knows is likely to cause
annoyance or alarm including, but not limited to, intrastate telephone calls
initiated by vendors for the purpose of selling goods or services.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(2) (2007).
262
Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 778.
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III. ANALYSIS
The approved policy is a useful template for employers because
many of its provisions consistently reflect the improvements from previous
policies invalidated by the GC.263 The policy does not explicitly or implicitly
restrict employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity because it
allows employees to “friend” co-workers through social media, and
employees may post images without obtaining employer approval first.264 In
addition, the approved policy effectively utilizes sufficiently limiting
language narrow enough to define specific categories of prohibited photos,
statements, video, or audio, but broad enough so as not to limit protected
concerted activity. 265 The approved policy provides helpful guidance to
employers attempting to incorporate a lawful FTC provision because the
policy language addresses FTC regulations and trademark provision
concerns of the employers.266 However, some of the provisions within the
approved policy warrant caution before implementation.
Employers cannot automatically implement the approved policy
without revisions because the GC is inconsistent in his analysis of numerous
provisions. The GC is inconsistent in his analysis and conclusions regarding
specific policy provisions, such as financial disclosure provisions, accuracy
in online provisions, veiled threat provisions, and internal procedure
provisions. 267 The approved policy is also inadequate because it fails to
notify employees regarding how the social media policy is monitored or
enforced. 268 For example, the approved policy may violate state off-duty
protection statutes and new social media legislation.269 The inadequacies are
not without remedies so long as the employer engages in thoughtful drafting
of policy provisions.270
263
See supra text accompanying notes 67–68, 72, 216–220 (describing the
approved policy’s use of limiting language to exclude protected concerted activity and the
approved policy’s FTC provision in comparison to previously reviewed FTC policies).
264
See supra text accompanying notes 59–61 (describing the approved policy’s
“Be Respectful” provision, which encourages employees to utilize the open door policy but
does not prohibit employees from using social media so long as postings are not egregious).
265
See supra text accompanying note 60 (providing the exact approved policy
language, which states employees are precluded from posting videos, photographs, or audio
that fits into specified categories).
266
See supra text accompanying notes 70–72 (providing the exact approved policy
language for trademark and FTC provisions).
267
See supra notes 62–64, 75 and accompanying text (providing examples of
approved policy language); but see supra text accompanying notes 83–84, 90–91, 93–98,
180–181 (providing examples of provisions declared unlawful).
268
See supra text accompanying note 224 (explaining that employers should
notify employees how their social media policy is enforced).
269
See supra text accompanying notes 227–230 (describing the states that enacted
off-duty protection statutes and the states that recently enacted social media legislation).
270
See supra text accompanying note 48 (arguing the approved policy is a great
template for employers, but employers must exercise great care when drafting the employer’s
own policy).
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The deficiencies of the approved policy are corrected after the policy
is carefully tailored to an employer’s business. 271 Businesses need to
determine if they operate in a state with off-duty protection statutes, social
media statutes, or statutes limiting termination for good cause. 272 Next,
employers must use limiting language and reject the use of a savings clause
as boilerplate policy language because the GC is consistent in his analysis of
limiting language and in rejecting the use of a savings clause, thus providing
two assurances employers can rely on when drafting social media policy
provisions.273 Finally, employers can overcome the GC’s inconsistencies in
analysis and the overly broad provisions of the approved policy by testing a
drafted policy against the GC’s general test for social media policies.274
A. The Approved Policy Provision Satisfies the NLRA, Trademark, FTC,
and Financial Disclosure Requirements.
The GC provides some explanation describing why specific
provisions of the approved policy are lawful, but further analysis proves
additional approved policy provisions are valid.275 For example, many of the
approved provisions do not chill protected concerted activity because
communications about employment terms and conditions are not
restricted. 276 In addition, the trademark and FTC provisions are lawful
because the language of both approved policy provisions is consistent with
the GC’s previous analysis of similar policy provisions.277

271

See supra text accompanying note 47 (stating the approved policy was drafted
for Wal-Mart, a national corporation).
272
See supra text accompanying notes 227–230 (explaining the statutory purpose
and providing citations to the exact statutory language).
273
See supra text accompanying notes 47, 113–118 (comparing the approved
policy with the GC’s prior analysis on savings clauses); see also supra text accompanying
notes 67–68, 75, 90–92, 94–98, 101–102, 120–127 (citing a variety of approved policy
provisions and unlawful policy provisions and demonstrating the GC’s reliance on sufficiently
limiting language to either approve the policy or declare the provision unlawful).
274
See supra text accompanying notes 51–53 (detailing the GC’s general test for
social media policy provisions).
275
See supra text accompanying notes 67–68, 74–75 (detailing the GC’s analysis
for finding specific provisions lawful).
276
See supra text accompanying note 275 (explaining the provisions contain
sufficiently limiting language to exclude discussions about employment terms and conditions).
277
See supra text accompanying notes 69–72, 110–112, 216–223 (providing the
approved policy language for the FTC and trademark provisions and comparing the text with
that from previously lawful provisions).
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1. The Approved Policy Does Not Explicitly Restrict Protected Concerted
Activity and Contains Sufficiently Limiting Language to Exclude Protected
Concerted Activities in the NLRA, FTC, and Trademark Provisions.
Under the GC’s approved policy, employees are not prevented from
representing themselves through protected concerted activity. 278 The
approved policy is valid because the approved language uses sufficiently
limiting language to ensure the policy does not embrace protected concerted
activity, thereby curing the defects afflicting previous unlawful policies.279
Previous policies have prevented co-workers from “friending” each other on
Facebook, required an employer’s permission before posting, and prohibited
employees from using social media to discuss the terms and conditions of
employment.280 Unlike unlawful policy provisions that failed to use limiting
language in provisions addressing images and video, the approved policy’s
provisions successfully prohibit employees from posting specific categories
of statements, photos, or videos by identifying that prohibited posts are those
that are discriminatory, threatening, intimidating, or malicious.281 Thus, the
provision clearly applies only to egregious conduct, such as malicious
actions or threats of harm, making the approved policy superior to other
unlawful policies.282
The approved policy is superior because egregious conduct cannot
reasonably be interpreted by employees to include a picket line or criticisms
of the terms and conditions of employment.283 Egregious conduct describes a
hostile work environment, not the types of activities employees intend to use
to improve terms and conditions of employment. 284 Limiting language
satisfying anti-bullying statutes requires employers to prohibit conduct
intending to harm or create a hostile work environment, and the approved

278

See supra text accompanying note 61, 67–68, 75 (detailing the limiting
language of the approved policy).
279
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (providing the approved limited
policy language); but see supra text accompanying notes 177–178, 180–181 (providing
unlawful policy provisions).
280
See supra text accompanying notes 83, 86, 90–91, 177, 197, 199 (providing
examples of unlawful policy provisions preventing discussions about protected concerted
activity, requiring permission before a post, and discouraging employees from “friending”
each other on Facebook).
281
See supra text accompanying notes 60, 67 (providing the approved limited
policy language); but see supra text accompanying notes 104–109 (providing an example of
an unlawful policy without sufficiently limiting language).
282
See supra text accompanying note 61 (describing what type of conduct falls
within the provision).
283
See supra text accompanying note 61 (describing activity by employees that is
egregious in the approved policy).
284
See supra text accompanying notes 61, 68 (stating the approved policy
language and stating it is not unlawful because it describes egregious conduct).
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policy effectively prohibits this type of conduct while preserving the
employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity.285
The GC also approved the policy because the policy does not rely on
a “savings clause,” whereas other policies relied on the use of a savings
clause to cure the provisions’ ambiguities. 286 Instead, the approved policy
relies on limiting language to cure its ambiguities, as required by the GC’s
general test for social media policies.287 In addition, the approved policy is
successful because it does not attempt to restrict the type of conversations in
which employees may engage on the internet.
The “Be Respectful” provision does not require a friendly tone or
require employees to avoid picking fights, which is an improvement from
previous unlawful policies. 288 Conversations about unionism have the
potential to become heated and may require the use of an unfriendly tone,
which is why it is necessary to have policy provisions that do not prohibit
unfriendly tones.289 For example, referring to one’s boss as a “dick” and a
“scumbag” qualifies as an unfriendly tone, but the GC deemed the discussion
as lawful because it related to the terms and conditions of employment.290
The risk that employees might construe the approved policy provision as
preventing heated or unfriendly discussions about working conditions is
minimal because the provision defines inappropriate postings as
discriminatory, harassing, or intentionally malicious.291 These categories do
not prevent employees from fighting about union activities or engaging in a
heated discussion about the terms and conditions of employment because
such discussions will generally fall short of discriminatory, harassing, or
intentionally malicious standards.292
The GC allows social media policies to prohibit employees from
posting unauthorized statements on behalf of the employer, and that

285
See supra text accompanying notes 61, 261 (comparing the policy language to
the types of activities covered in anti-bullying statutes).
286
See supra text accompanying notes 115–118 (describing why savings clauses
are invalid).
287
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 67–68, 75 (describing how limiting
language is used in the approved policies).
288
See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (providing the exact language of
the approved policy); see also supra text accompanying notes 124–126 (describing an
unlawful policy reasonably construed to prevent heated discussions about unionism).
289
See supra text accompanying notes 124–126 (supplying the GC’s rationale for
invalidating policy provisions precluding employees from engaging in heated discussions).
290
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting that these terms were lawful
because they related to the terms and conditions of employment).
291
See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (providing the approved policy
language); see also supra text accompanying notes 120–127 (illustrating how the limiting
language operates in comparison to an overly broad policy).
292
See supra text accompanying notes 58–61 (providing the approved policy
language); see also supra text accompanying notes 120–122 (describing why the GC
invalidated a similar policy and applying that same analysis to the approved policy language).
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prohibition is clearly articulated in the approved policy.293 For example, the
GC concluded that a policy provision that restricted all employees from
making statements on behalf of the employer was unlawful, and the
approved policy incorporates language substantially similar to the lawful
provisions.294 The approved policy satisfies the GC’s general test because the
language cannot reasonably be construed to include protected concerted
activity and the GC recognizes an employer’s legitimate interest in
protecting against unauthorized postings on behalf of the employer.295 The
provision is not at risk because the limiting language allows employees to
create a blog or post related to working terms and conditions, provided the
employees identify the statement as their own opinion and not on behalf of
the employer. The approved policy language, like other previously lawful
policies, clearly notifies employees they are not authorized to represent the
employer and they may only make representations on personal interests.
Thus, the provision effectively excludes protected concerted activity and
protects against construing the language as interfering with an employee’s
right to discuss employment terms and conditions.
2. The Approved Policy Provision Addressing FTC Regulations and
Trademark Provisions is Lawful Because the Policy Will Not Reasonably
be Construed to Include Protected Concerted Activity.
The GC acknowledges an employer’s legitimate need for
disclaimers, like the one in the approved policy, to prevent unauthorized
postings about products or services, provided the provision cannot
reasonably be construed to encompass concerted activity. 296 The GC’s
approved policy conforms with the FTC requirements because both the FTC
and the approved policy recommend the use of a sample disclaimer and
require the employee to only express her opinions and disclose the
employee’s relationship to the employer.297 The FTC requires an employee
to only express her personal opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences about
an employer’s products or services, as opposed to representing the statement
is on behalf of the employer or representing a neutral consumer, and the
approved policy conforms to this requirement by requiring an employee’s

293

See supra text accompanying note 221 (explaining employers have a legitimate
need to prevent unauthorized postings).
294
See supra text accompanying notes 72, 221 (comparing the approved policy
language with a paraphrased lawful policy provision).
295
See supra text accompanying note 221 (explaining why the GC approved
policy language limiting unauthorized postings).
296
See supra text accompanying note 221 (stating the GC’s reasoning for
approving the use of disclaimers).
297
See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining the new FTC
requirements and providing the approved policy language).

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

39

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 8

556

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

post to reflect only her opinion.298 The FTC also requires an employee to
disclose her connection to the employer because the FTC has an interest in
protecting consumers from misrepresented endorsements of an employer’s
products or services.299 The approved policy adequately addresses the FTC’s
concerns by requiring an employee to disclose that she is the employer’s
associate, effectively eliminating any concern an employee may misrepresent
an endorsement of the employer’s products or services on a blog or other
website.300 The FTC also requires a clear and conspicuous disclaimer and the
approved policy mirrors this requirement by encouraging employees to use a
disclaimer; it even provides a sample disclaimer to incorporate in an
employee’s posting.301 Therefore, this policy effectively incorporates the new
FTC standards by notifying the employee how to appropriately endorse the
employer’s products and services on the internet and reduces the employer’s
and the employee’s potential liability for unlawful FTC endorsements.302
Unlike previous unlawful policies attempting to prohibit employees
from posting trade secrets online, the approved policy effectively precludes
employees from disclosing trade secrets and provides sufficiently limiting
language to exclude protected concerted activity. 303 The GC recognizes
employees do not have a right to disclose trade secrets, but policies aimed at
preventing such disclosures have been invalidated for using overly broad
language that encompasses protected concerted activity. 304 The approved
policy remedies this problem by including sufficiently limiting language so
as not to infringe on protected concerted activity.305 The approved policy’s
use of sufficiently limiting language for trade secrets (development of
systems, processes, products, know-how, and technology) warrants the GC’s
support because it satisfies the second prong of the GC’s social media test by
insuring employees cannot reasonably construe “trade secrets” to include
protected concerted activity.306 Thus, the approved policy cures the defects of
298

See supra notes 72, 213 and accompanying text (describing endorsement

requirements).
299

See supra text accompanying note 214 (telling employees they must disclose
their relationship to the employer).
300
See supra note 72 and accompanying text (showing that the approved policy
language requires employees to disclose their relationship to the employer).
301
See supra notes 72, 214 and accompanying text (requiring employees to use a
clear and conspicuous disclaimer to comply with FTC regulations and the approved policy
also provides a disclaimer).
302
See supra text accompanying note 208 (explaining that the employer and the
employee risk liability for an endorsement failing to meet the FTC guidelines).
303
See supra text accompanying notes 73–74, 187 (explaining that the GC
declared employees do not have a right to disclose trade secrets)
304
See supra text accompanying note 187 (explaining the GC stated employees do
not have a right to disclose trade secrets).
305
See supra text accompanying notes 73–74, 128 (comparing the GC’s previous
analysis to the approved policy).
306
See supra text accompanying notes 53–54, 73–74 (referring to the GC’s social
media test and comparing it to the approved policy language).
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previous unlawful policies by relying on sufficiently limiting language to
exclude protected concerted activity.
B. The Approved Policy is Insufficient Because it Fails to Consider OffDuty Protection Statutes and New Social Media Legislation. In Addition,
the Approved Policy is Insufficient Because it is an Unfair Labor Practice
to Threaten Employees and Social Media Use is Expressly Prohibited
Without Notification to Employees of How the Policy is Enforced.
The GC’s approved social media policy fails to consider many
important issues related to employers. First, the GC’s approved policy fails
to recognize specific state statutes giving employees additional
protections. 307 Second, the policy language contains a veiled threat to
employees, which legitimate social media policies cannot do because so
doing constitutes an unfair labor practice.308 Third, the GC is inconsistent in
his analysis of specific policy provisions. 309 Finally, the policy fails to
consider whether an absolute prohibition on social media is a workable
standard.310
1. The Approved Policy Violates Off-Duty Protection Statutes Because it
Fails to Incorporate the Appropriate Standards.
The approved policy violates off-duty protection statutes by
threatening termination for lawful activities conducted off an employer’s
premises and containing a lower standard justifying termination than the offduty statutes.311 The courts have not analyzed any provision attempting to
incorporate off-duty protection statutes into the policy language, which is
likely why the employer failed to incorporate similar provisions in the
307
See supra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing the different off-duty
protection statutes).
308
See supra text accompanying notes 32, 64 (stating it is an unfair labor practice
to restrict or coerce employees in the exercise of protected concerted activity and providing
the approved policy language acted as a veiled threat to employees by reminding employees
the internet archives everything).
309
See supra text accompanying notes 64, 180–181 (providing the approved
policy language in comparison to overly broad policy language acting as a threat to
employees); see also supra text accompanying notes 63, 101–102 (comparing the approved
policy language requiring complete accuracy in online posts with a previously invalidated
policy); see also supra text accompanying notes 72, 190–202 (analyzing the approved policy
language forbidding the release of confidential information in comparison to previously
unlawful policies); see also supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (comparing the
approved policy language to a provision previously deemed unlawful).
310
See supra text accompanying note 77 (explaining to employees that social
media is prohibited at work).
311
See supra notes 57, 227–229 and accompanying text (arguing the sample
policy language has a lower standard for termination and discipline than how the off-duty
protection statutes have been interpreted).

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

41

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 8

558

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

approved policy. 312 All off-duty protection statutes protect an employee’s
conduct outside of work.313 If an employee is terminated or disciplined under
the approved policy, the “adverse effect” language may conflict with
Colorado, North Dakota, or New York’s off-duty protection statutes, which
is why employers need to consider the statutes’ effect when drafting social
media policies provisions.314
For example, Colorado protects an employee from being fired so
long as she is engaging in lawful activity during nonworking hours and off
the premises of the employer, unless it is reasonably and rationally related to
an employer’s business—but the approved policy does not adequately meet
the requirements of Colorado’s statute.315 First, the approved policy threatens
employees with either disciplinary action or termination for actions that
adversely affect the employer, but the statute protects employees from
termination and extends protection to all off-duty activities, even if related to
work.316 Based on case law, scholars believe the Colorado courts will protect
an employee’s off-duty social networking conduct because it is neither a
conflict of interest nor related to employment responsibilities, whereas the
approved policy restricts employees’ off-duty activities by threatening
termination based solely on an “adverse effect.”317 Thus, the approved policy
is overly broad in comparison to employees’ off-duty protections awarded
under the statute because both the statute and the NLRA will protect the
employees’ off-duty, work-related social media conduct so long as the
activity is lawful or classified as protected concerted activity.
North Dakota protects employees from termination or discipline
when the employee engages in a lawful activity off an employer’s
premises—but the approved policy infers a lower standard may be used to
justify termination. 318 An employee may be terminated or disciplined for
lawful activity that has an “adverse effect” on a legitimate business interest
under the approved policy, meaning an employee may be unlawfully
terminated for actions protected by North Dakota’s statute. 319 Scholars
312

See supra note 232 and accompanying text (explaining there is little precedent
applying the statutes to policies).
313
See supra note 227 and accompanying text (providing examples of off-duty
protection statutes).
314
See supra notes 57, 227 and accompanying text (describing statutes providing
protection to employees outside the NRLA).
315
See supra note 227 and accompanying text (describing Colorado’s off-duty
protection statute).
316
See supra notes 57, 228 and accompanying text (comparing the off-duty
protection statute language to the approved policy provision requirement of “adverse effect”).
317
See supra notes 57, 229 and accompanying text (comparing commentary on the
off-duty protection statute to the approved policy provision requirement of an “adverse
effect”).
318
See supra notes 57, 227 and accompanying text (describing the statutory
language of North Dakota’s off-duty protection statue and the approved policy language).
319
See supra notes 57, 227, 229 and accompanying text (comparing the approved
policy provision language to North Dakota’s off-duty protection statutes and commentary on
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suggest North Dakota’s broad view of lawful activity protects employee
actions such as blogging and social media posts, and thus the approved
policy’s view that any activity, including activity off the employer’s
premises, which adversely affects the employer is too broad and embraces
protected employee conduct.320
Finally, the New York statute may be interpreted quite broadly to
afford employees a wide breadth of protection, whereas the approved policy
restricts employees’ protection from termination for online conduct. 321
Although New York courts have interpreted the statute narrowly, at least two
judges have concluded a narrow interpretation undermines the legislature’s
intent, and the term “recreational activities” must be interpreted broadly.322
The courts may interpret the statutory language to include employees’
blogging, Tweeting, or Facebook as “recreational activity” or a “hobby,” but
the approved policy threatens either discipline or termination of an employee
if an employee’s action has an adverse effect on the business.323 Therefore,
the approved policy is flawed, as it may encompass a breadth of employee
activity protected by New York’s off-duty protection statute. 324 Absent
additional judicial interpretation broadening the term “recreational activities”
or “hobby” to social media posts and employee termination, the approved
policy language may reasonably include protected employee conduct.325
Employers operating in states with off-duty protection statutes must
ensure their social media policies do not impinge on employees’ protected
concerted activity rights, and employees’ rights protected under the off-duty
protection statutes.326 Thus, employers must not adopt the approved policy’s
standard of “adverse effect” for determining whether to discipline or
how North Dakota courts may apply the off-duty protection statute in the social media
context).
320
See supra notes 57, 228 and accompanying text (arguing the approved policy
language is overly broad in comparison to the case law and providing scholarly commentary
on North Dakota’s off-duty protection statute).
321
See supra note 227 and accompanying text (stating New York’s off-duty
protection statute).
322
See supra notes 57, 228–229 and accompanying text (detailing the
interpretations by the NY courts and the potential for the statutory terms to embrace social
media activity).
323
See supra notes 57, 228–229 and accompanying text (arguing that the approved
policy provision may not be overly broad in New York because both a concurrence and
dissent suggested the off-duty protection statute must be interpreted broadly).
324
See supra notes 57, 228–229 and accompanying text (providing the approved
policy language and describing disagreements among New York judges about the proper
interpretation of New York’s off-duty protection statute).
325
See supra notes 228–229 and accompanying text (describing the different
opinions of “recreational activities” and suggesting it may be extended to blogging because
the terms have the potential to be interpreted broadly).
326
See supra notes 30–32, 227–228 and accompanying text (explaining off-duty
protection statutes may provide additional protection to employees from an employer’s
disciplinary or termination procedures for lawful activity conducted “off-the-clock,” in
addition to the protections provided by the NRLA).

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

43

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 8

560

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

terminate an employee because so doing could cause an employer to run
afoul of off-duty protection statutes.
2. The Approved Policy May Also Violate New Statutes Specifically
Governing Social Media.
The off-duty protection statutes are not the only legislation providing
employees protection; several states recently enacted legislation specifically
addressing social media in the employment context, but the approved policy
fails to recognize these advancements in the law. 327 California, Illinois,
Maryland, and Michigan now forbid employers from requiring employees to
provide employers with their social media usernames and passwords, but the
approved policy fails to notify employees of their right to refuse to divulge
their username and passwords. 328 How the courts will interpret and apply
these statutes to employees will certainly develop in the coming years.329 The
approved policy fails to incorporate recent statutory enactments, and
employers operating within states enacting social media specific statutes
must ensure any social media policy does not violate employee rights
protected by the statute.330
3. The GC is Inconsistent in His Analysis and Conclusions about
Provisions Containing Veiled Threats to Employees, Employers’
Requirement of Complete Honesty and Accuracy, Employers’ Limiting
Language for Confidential Information, and Employers’ Encouragement
to Employees to Use the Open Door Policy.
The approved policy tells employees that the internet archives almost
anything, which effectively threatens employees with a clear message that
any activity can be retrieved and used as grounds for termination.331 The GC
is inconsistent in evaluating veiled threats to employees because he found a
policy similar to the approved provision unlawful. 332 The unlawful policy
327
See supra notes 230–233 and accompanying text (describing the states that
recently enacted legislation and demonstrating the date of the approved policy was 2012).
328
See supra text accompanying note 230 (describing the states that recently
enacted social media legislation).
329
See supra note 233 and accompanying text (stating the legislation was enacted
in 2012).
330
See supra notes 230–233 and accompanying text (demonstrating the approved
policy does not incorporate the recent social media legislation, and showing four states have
enacted social media legislation, while other states are currently considering social media
legislation).
331
See supra notes 57, 64 and accompanying text (showing that the approved
policy guidelines clearly state employees are subject to termination or disciplinary action for
violations of the policy and the approved policy later reminds employees the internet archives
almost everything).
332
See supra text accompanying notes 64, 178–181 (providing an example of an
unlawful policy provision in comparison to the approved policy provision).
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also reminds employees there are consequences for social media activities
when they violate the employer’s policies, and the approved policy uses
similar threatening language when it states anything posted online in
violation of the policy is retrievable, even if deleted.333 The GC found the
unlawful provision chilled protected concerted activities, and the approved
policy should be equally invalid because the approved policy explicitly
discourages employees from engaging in protected concerted activity, and as
such, violates the first prong of the GC’s social media test.334
Alternatively, the approved policy also fails under the second prong
of the GC’s test because reasonable employees will construe the provision as
limiting discussions about terms and conditions of employment by
suggesting the employer may retrieve information without a report from a
co-worker or without a specific invitation to view the information.335 The
unlawful policy reminded employees that consequences could result from
policy violations, and likewise, the approved policy suggests to employees
that the employer can retrieve specific information about the employees
without an invitation or revealing a source and with a result such as
discipline or termination for violations. 336 The GC’s inconsistency in
evaluating the validity of provisions sounding as veiled threats reduces the
credibility of the GC’s decision in rendering this policy provision lawful.337
Therefore, employers should not simply copy and paste the GC’s approved
policy because it contains flaws that restrict employees’ rights to engage in
protected concerted activity.
The GC is also inconsistent in his evaluations and ultimate
conclusions regarding provisions requiring complete honesty and accuracy in
online posts.338 The GC held a provision unlawful for requiring employees to
be completely honest and not misleading, and the approved policy contains
similar language requiring the employees to always be honest and accurate

333

See supra text accompanying notes 64, 180–181 (comparing the approved
policy language to an unlawful policy provision reminding employees there are internal and
external consequences for an employee’s behavior online).
334
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 64, 178–180 (analogizing the approved
policy provision to an unlawful policy provision and comparing the approved policy provision
to the general GC test).
335
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 64, 132–133, 142 (inferring from the
GC’s general test for social media policy that the approved policy language may reasonably
be construed to include unlawful surveillance activity).
336
See supra notes 64, 179 and accompanying text (stating the approved policy
language, in comparison to the unlawful provision, and explaining that employers engage in
unlawful surveillance by revealing specific information that is not generally known and the
employer does not reveal its source.).
337
See supra notes 64, 179 and accompanying text (showing that the
inconsistency between the outcome and the language of the two policies makes the GC’s
analysis suspect).
338
See supra text accompanying notes 62–63, 101–102 (comparing the approved
policy language with a policy provision the GC previously declared unlawful).
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when posting information or news.339 The GC reasoned the unlawful policy
was overly broad and encompassed protected concerted activity, whereas the
GC failed to provide guidance as to why the approved policy was lawful.340
The GC should have reasoned the approved policy was unlawful for the
same reasons it deemed previous policies unlawful—employees may
reasonably construe it as a limitation on discussions about the employer’s
labor policies and its treatment of employees. 341 Therefore, the approved
policy provision is as overly broad as the unlawful policy, and employers
should be aware of this.342
The GC is also inconsistent in his analysis of the approved provision
prohibiting the release of private or confidential information because the
approved policy’s limiting language fails to exclude protected concerted
activity.343 The GC typically invalidates social media provisions failing to
use limiting language to define “confidential company” or “material”
information because the terms are vague and can reasonably encompass
protected concerted activity, but the approved policy is substantially similar
to, if not worse than, the language used in provisions previously found
unlawful. 344 The approved policy unsuccessfully attempts to qualify the
vague term “confidential information” with limiting language by restricting
the term to mean “internal reports, policies, procedures, or other internal
business-related confidential communications,” but these terms are more
vague than language previously invalidated by the GC. 345 The GC’s
inconsistency is most apparent when comparing the two provisions’ limiting
language because the unlawful provision is more precise, using terms like
“company performance,” “cost increases,” and “customer wins,” while the
approved policy’s language uses vague terms like “internal reports,”

339

See supra text accompanying notes 62–63, 101–102 (comparing the approved
policy language with the unlawful policy language).
340
See supra text accompanying notes 45, 102 (providing the citation to the entire
social media policy to demonstrate there is no analysis on why the policy provision is lawful;
however, in the same memo the GC declared the policy provision invalid).
341
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 62–63, 102 (demonstrating the
approved policy provision meets the GC’s second prong and, therefore, the same analysis
applied to the unlawful provision should apply the approved provision).
342
See supra text accompanying notes 62–63, 101–102 (arguing the two policy
provisions are sufficiently similar to warrant the same analysis and conclusion as the unlawful
provision).
343
See supra text accompanying notes 68–71, 92–97, 190–202 (comparing the
approved policy language with its limiting language to policy provisions the GC previously
declared unlawful).
344
See supra text accompanying notes 70, 189–190, 194–195, 201–202
(comparing the approved policy language of “confidential information” with previously
invalidated provisions also using the term “confidential” or “material” information).
345
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (quoting the approved policy
language); see supra text accompanying notes 94–98 (discussing a previously invalidated
provision which attempted to use limiting language).
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“policies,” and “procedures.”346 The GC should have concluded the approved
policy provision’s limiting language embraces communications relevant to
union negotiations; both provisions are reasonably construed to include
protected concerted activity because the limiting language is overly broad.347
The approved policy terms were so vague that they enveloped the unlawful
policy terms, and therefore deserved the same conclusion the GC reached
with regard to the unlawful provision: the limiting language is unlawful
because it is relevant to union negotiations related to employees’ wages and
benefits.348
Furthermore, the GC previously struck down the term “contract”
when it was used as limiting language for the term “confidential
information,” but the GC found lawful the broad and vague term “internal
business-related confidential communications” in the approved policy.349 The
GC should have concluded the approved policy’s attempt at limiting
language was invalid because, like the unlawful policy, “internal business
communications” may include collective bargaining agreements. The GC is
inconsistent in his evaluation of confidential information, especially when
employers attempt to use limiting language.350
Finally, the GC is inconsistent in his analysis and conclusion of
provisions encouraging employees to utilize internal procedures rather than
vent on social media websites.351 The GC came to inconsistent conclusions
regarding the approved policy and an unlawful provision even though both
provisions explicitly encouraged employees to resolve work-related disputes
by working through internal resources rather than posting complaints on the
internet.352 The GC reasoned the unlawful policy had the probable effect of
precluding or inhibiting protected concerted activity, and the approved policy

346

See supra text accompanying notes 71, 94–98 (arguing the GC’s analysis of the
approved policy’s limiting language and the analysis applied to the unlawful limiting language
warrants the conclusion the approved policy is unlawful).
347
See supra text accompanying notes 96–97 (explaining the GC’s analysis for
invalidating the previous policy’s limiting language and arguing the same analysis should
apply to the approved policy’s limiting language).
348
See supra text accompanying notes 71, 94–98 (comparing the GC’s analysis in
the previous unlawful provision to the approved provision and concluding both should be
unlawful).
349
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (quoting the approved policy
language); see supra text accompanying note 95 (comparing the approved policy provision’s
term to a previously invalidated term used in a provision’s limiting language).
350
See supra text accompanying notes 71, 94–98 (arguing the GC’s analysis is
inconsistent because the approved and unlawful provisions are substantially similar).
351
See supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (comparing the approved
policy provision to a previously invalidated provision encouraging employees to communicate
with co-workers, supervisors, and managers rather than posting complaints on the internet).
352
See supra notes 60, 85–87 and accompanying text (showing that both the
approved policy and an unlawful policy encouraged employees to utilize internal procedures
to resolve work disputes, but the GC only invalidated one of the provisions).
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has the same probable effect.353 In both instances the employer discourages
the employee from posting work-related criticisms online, and both
encourage the employee to use internal procedures for redress in workrelated disputes.354 In this case, the GC should have concluded the approved
policy provision was invalid as a violation of the second prong of the GC’s
test because the provision may reasonably be interpreted to include protected
concerted activity.355
4. The Approved Policy Bans Employees from Using Social Media During
Work Without Notification of How the Policy is Enforced or Monitored.
Finally, under the approved policy, the employees are completely
banned from using social media without any notification of how the policy is
monitored or enforced, which means the social media policy is not clear or
robust enough to restrict employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy.356
The approved policy language attempts to restrict employees’ reasonable
expectations of privacy by expressly forbidding the use of social media
during work hours, unless authorized by a manager. However, the policy
language fails to notify the employee how the social media policy is
monitored, and the employee may have a reasonable expectation of privacy
until the employer provides notice that a monitoring system is in place.357 In
addition, employees regularly use social media in today’s workplace by
using their smartphone or other personal devices, making it unreasonable to
completely ban social media use at a person’s place of employment.358 Thus,
unless the employer can clearly show associates are not using social media at

353
See supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (comparing the similarities
between the approved policy language and the unlawful policy and concluding the GC’s
analysis applies to both provisions).
354
See supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (showing GC should have
applied the same conclusion to the approved policy and the unlawful policy because the
provisions are substantially similar).
355
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 60, 85–86 (showing the GC’s general
test for social media and the GC’s conclusion regarding a substantially similar provision
warranted a conclusion the approved policy was unlawful).
356
See supra notes 77, 239 and accompanying text (stating that the approved
policy prohibits the use of social media during work and the Supreme Court and other state
court cases have stated a clear robust policy may help to confine an employee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy).
357
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 236 (providing the test used in Quon
and other state court cases to determine whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
358
See supra text accompanying notes 238, 249 (stating the Supreme Court
recognizes many employers at least tolerate personal internet use and the GC further
recognizes employees’ regular use of social media).
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work, the policy will fail.359 The employer should have acknowledged most
employees use social media and prescribed its use.
C. Employers May Rely on the Approved Policy as a Template, But Must
Not Adopt it Without Giving Consideration to its Limitations.
Employers must tailor the approved policy and not merely supplant
the policy’s boilerplate language. First, employers must evaluate the
operational realities within their own state or industry, consider off-duty
protection statutes and social media statutes when applicable, and clearly
notify employees of how a policy is monitored and enforced to constrain
employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy. 360 Second, the GC’s
inconsistency in his analysis of specific provisions undermines the validity
and reliability of many of the approved policy provisions and requires
employers to return to the GC’s general test for guidance. 361 Third,
employers cannot reasonably expect the approved policy to remain current,
as clearly illustrated by the recent and pending enactment of social media
legislation and agencies’ increased attention on the impact of social media on
product endorsements, insider trading, and protected concerted activity. 362
This is a growing area of law and any social media policy will require
regular revisions to remain current and lawful. Finally, employers need to
conduct a reasonable investigation before terminating an employee for his or
her online postings that relate to the terms and conditions of employment to
prevent against allegations of unlawful terminations.363 The GC’s approved
policy is a suitable template and can act as a checklist for employers when
drafting or revising a social media policy after employers acknowledge the
approved policy’s limitations.

359

See supra text accompanying note 245 (explaining the social media policy
must mirror the operational realities of the workplace; otherwise, the employer risks the policy
being nullified).
360
See supra text accompanying notes 227–230, 234–235 (requiring social media
policies to reflect the operational realities of the workplace and describing legislation that may
impact social media policies).
361
See supra notes 60, 63–64, 71, 85–86 and accompanying text (quoting the
relevant lawful and unlawful policy language); see supra text accompanying notes 94–98,
101–102, 178–180 (comparing a variety of provisions previously reviewed by the GC).
362
See supra text accompanying notes 185–186, 203–206, 210 (identifying
ambiguities in the interaction between social media and employment law social media
policies).
363
See supra text accompanying notes 48, 237 (inferring that changes in society
may change an employee’s reasonable expectations of privacy when monitoring and enforcing
a policy).
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1. The Approved Policy was Drafted for a National Retail Organization
and is Not Suitable for Single-State Businesses or Small to Medium MultiState Businesses.
The approved policy does not adequately address the needs of local
businesses, single-state enterprises, or other industries. The approved policy
is limited in its application to every business because the policy was drafted
and tailored to a specific industry, a national retail organization. 364 For
example, single-state companies need to re-draft their social media
provisions to consider state law such as off-duty protection statutes,
termination for good cause, anti-bullying statutes, or social media statutes.365
The policy also does not appropriately address the social media needs of
financial institutions or hospitals.366 Hospitals must incorporate social media
provisions addressing HIPAA and notifying employees they are subject to
termination for posts suggesting appropriate medical care will not be
provided when necessary, both of which are not covered in the approved
policy. 367 Financial institutions must provide a more detailed discussion
about financial disclosure laws and what types of conduct violates insider
trading laws because the Federal Bureau of Investigation recently announced
that a dedicated taskforce will search social media websites in an effort to
ferret out insider trading violations. 368 Employers cannot rely on the
approved policy to adequately address every company’s needs and, therefore,
employers are encouraged to rely on experts within the employment industry
to help tailor the approved policy to the employer’s specific industry and
needs.
2. The GC Provides Employers with Some Reliable Tools by Consistently
Highlighting the Importance of Limiting Language and Emphasizing His
Continued Rejection of a Savings Clause.
The approved social media policy demonstrates the GC’s consistent
reliance on limiting language to clarify any ambiguities within the policy and

364
See supra text accompanying note 47 (identifying Wal-Mart as the company
that drafted the policy).
365
See supra text accompanying notes 227–231 (identifying additional
considerations employers need to take into account before implementing the policy).
366
See supra text accompanying notes 129–130, 203 (identifying additional
considerations, including financial disclosure and issues specific to the health care industry).
367
See supra text accompanying notes 129–130 (discussing the GC’s decision that
drafting disparaging posts suggesting appropriate medical care may not be rendered is not
protected concerted activity).
368
See supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that the FBI created a
dedicated task force to ferret out insider trading violations).
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the GC’s continued rejection of a savings clause.369 The GC’s approval of a
policy that heavily relies on limiting language clearly demonstrates to
employers the importance of using limiting language to clarify any
ambiguities within the policy. 370 Based on the GC’s continued focus on
limiting language in his three memos and the approval of a policy with
plenty of limiting language, employers should infer the GC will favorably
review policies utilizing sufficiently limiting language to qualify vague terms
in an employment policy. 371 Along similar lines, the GC’s continued
rejection and the GC’s subsequent approval of a policy without a savings
clause means employers must not incorporate a savings clause into their
social media policy, regardless of whether its purpose is boilerplate language
or to cure policy ambiguities.372 The GC’s consistent analysis in the area of
limiting language and disapproval of a savings clause provides employers
reliable guidance on curing social media policy deficiencies.373
3. Employers Must Look to the GC’s General Test as Guidance When the
GC is Inconsistent in His Analysis or When the Approved Policy Provision
is Overly Broad.
The GC’s inconsistency in evaluations and conclusions related to
provisions attempting to restrict employees from posting confidential
information makes drafting a lawful provision difficult. Employers must
instead rely on the GC’s test for social media policies to effectively draft a
provision to prohibit insider trading by using limiting language to exclude
protected concerted activity.374 Also, when selecting the necessary limiting
language, employers cannot select vague terms, such as “company
performance,” “contract,” or “internal business communications,” to define
terms like “confidential” or “material information” because those terms are
reasonably construed to encompass terms and conditions of employment.375
369

See supra text accompanying notes 113–118 (discussing the GC’s continued
rejection of savings clauses and the fact that a lack of a saving clause in the approved policy
means the GC disapproves of savings clauses).
370
See supra notes 60–61, 67, 71 and accompanying text (detailing the limiting
language used in the approved policy provisions).
371
See supra text accompanying notes 60–61, 71, 91–98, 101–102, 120–127
(reviewing the GC’s analysis of overly broad policies and inferring the GC requires limiting
language).
372
See supra text accompanying notes 113–118 (inferring that the emphasis on
limiting language and the rejection of savings clauses suggest the GC only wants limiting
language to cure a policy’s ambiguities).
373
See supra text accompanying notes 60–61, 71, 91–98, 101–102, 113–118, 120–
127 (showing the GC’s consistent analysis throughout all the GC memos as it relates to the
GC’s emphasis on limiting language and rejection of a savings clause).
374
See supra text accompanying notes 52–53 (describing the GC’s general test for
a social media policy).
375
See supra text accompanying notes 94–97 (explaining the terms used are
overly broad and include protected concerted activity).
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The GC requires clear, robust limiting language to restrict the terms
“material” or “confidential” information.376 Employers, for example, could
meet the GC’s test for limiting language by stating:
Employees must maintain the confidentiality of the
employer’s material non-public information. Material nonpublic information includes providing a tip based on inside
information for the purchase and sale of securities. Material
non-public information does not include employees’
protected discussions about the terms and conditions of
employment, collective bargaining agreements, or union
activities.377
The GC’s inconsistency highlights the importance of tailoring any insider
trading policy provision rather than adopting the approved policy provision
verbatim.
The GC is inconsistent in his evaluation and conclusions related to
complete accuracy in online postings.378 The GC failed to analyze why the
approved policy’s command of accuracy is lawful; therefore, employers must
rely on the GC’s general test for social media policies to draft an appropriate
provision.379 Employers should encourage, rather than require, employees to
post only accurate and honest information because “encourage” connotes a
lower standard than “require,” and therefore is not reasonably construed to
prohibit concerted activity.380 In addition, employers must notify employees
they are only subject to discipline or termination for statements that are
maliciously false because employees do not receive protection under the
NLRA for maliciously false statements. 381 Thus, a lawful provision will
state:
376
See supra text accompanying 94–97, 191–195, 201–202 (inferring that the
policy’s attempt to incorporate limiting language is not sufficiently clear to exclude protected
concerted activity and other policies governing confidential information are overly broad).
377
See supra text accompanying notes 53,72, 96–97, 138–143, 147–154, 190, 194,
201 (citing the GC’s general test for a social media policy requiring limiting language and a
couple of sample cases that demonstrate the importance of notifying employees that only
certain activity is protected because not all employee discussions involve protected concerted
activity).
378
See supra text accompanying notes 61, 101–103 (inferring the GC is
inconsistent because the GC approved a provision requiring accuracy and honesty in the
approved policy, but deemed a substantially similar provision unlawful).
379
See supra text accompanying notes 47, 52–53 (referencing the approved social
media policy’s failure to disclose why the approved provision is lawful and highlighting the
GC’s general social media test).
380
See supra text accompanying note 102 (explaining the GC invalidates policies
requiring honesty and accuracy because, without sufficiently limiting language, the policies
embrace protected concerted activity).
381
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 102 (explaining that comments
amounting to maliciously false statements are not protected by the NLRA).
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Employees are prohibited from making statements on behalf
of the employer unless authorized. Employees making
statements about their personal beliefs or opinions on social
media websites are encouraged to be honest and accurate,
but employees will be subject to discipline, including
termination, for maliciously false statements or posts about a
person’s sex, creed, religion, or disability that contribute to a
hostile work environment.382
Employers must recognize that the GC’s inconsistency in analysis related to
the accuracy and honesty provisions means the approved policy’s honesty
and accuracy provision is suspicious and warrants revision before
implementation.
The GC is also inconsistent in his analysis of provisions
recommending employees use internal policy procedures to resolve work
related disputes. 383 Employers clearly cannot explicitly require that
employees use internal procedures to resolve disputes because this violates
the first prong of the GC’s test as an explicit restriction on protected
concerted activities. 384 The GC is inconsistent when evaluating whether
provisions encouraging the use of internal procedures are reasonably
construed to encompass protected concerted activity and, therefore, whether
employers should instead draft provisions with some derivative of the term
“suggest” because the term is arguably weaker when compared to drafting
terms such as “recommend” or “encourage.”385 The weaker language cannot
reasonably be construed to preclude or inhibit employees from pursuing
protected concerted activity on alternative forums, like social media, because
a suggestion does not connote penalties, but rather advice that may be freely
taken or discarded. 386 Just like other inconsistent opinions by the GC,
employers must recognize the GC’s inconsistent analysis makes the GC’s
382

See supra text accompanying notes 52–53, 68, 102, 221 (inferring from the
GC’s test and other policy provisions that an employer may lawfully forbid an employee from
making statements on behalf of the employer without authorization. Further, the GC prevented
employers from requiring complete honesty and accuracy, but the GC reasoned in other policy
provisions that maliciously false statements or egregious comments are not protected or
reasonably considered to be part of protected concerted activity so there should be limiting
language in a policy provision).
383
See supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (comparing the policy
provisions to demonstrate the GC’s inconsistency).
384
See supra text accompanying notes 52, 86–87 (stating that the GC applies the
first part of the analysis to invalidate provisions requiring employees to utilize internal
procedures over posting criticisms online, but the GC states an employer may suggest the
employees use internal procedures rather than social media).
385
See supra text accompanying note 85–86 (explaining an employer may suggest
an employee use internal procedures, while invalidating a provision that used the term
“encourage”).
386
See supra text accompanying note 86 (stating that an employer may “suggest”
employee actions).
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approval of the social media provision suspicious, and employers must test
any policy provision against the GC’s general test for social media
policies.387
Finally, the GC acknowledged that some of the approved provisions
are overly broad without the use of limiting language.388 For example, the
GC stated that “Be Respectful” is overly broad without the limiting language
and, therefore, any effort to tailor the approved policy by revising the
limiting language must be carefully reviewed to ensure the new language
meets the GC’s test for social media policies. 389 If an employer fails to
reevaluate the revised policy provision after editing the limiting language,
the employer risks the GC classifying the provision as overly broad because
employees may reasonably construe the policy as encompassing protected
concerted activity.390
4. A Social Media Policy Needs to Notify Employees How the Policy is
Enforced and How the Approved Policy is Limited in its Guidance to
Employers.
The approved policy is limited in its application to every business
because the approved policy does not reflect the operational realities of most
employers. 391 The approved policy fails to notify employees of how the
policy is enforced and only reflects the operational realities of a particular
organization; therefore, it needs to be tailored to the organizational structure
of each business.392 Small businesses need to evaluate the expense involved
with monitoring and enforcing a prohibition on social media. 393 Small
businesses may find it more cost-effective to allow the use of social media
during work hours because allowing social media eliminates the expense of
monitoring employees. 394 The downside of allowing social media means
387
See supra text accompanying notes 52–53, 60, 86–87 (referencing the GC’s
general social media test in light of the inconsistent analysis of the approved and unlawful
policy provision).
388
See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (stating the policy is overly broad
but the limiting language saves the provision).
389
See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (stating the policy is overly broad
but the limiting language saves the provision and prevents a reasonable employee from
interpreting the language to prohibit protected concerted activity).
390
See supra text accompanying notes 52–53 (suggesting that the GC’s general
test deems policies unlawful that do not include sufficient limiting language to exclude
protected concerted activity).
391
See supra text accompanying note 47 (stating the policy was drafted for a
specific national retail organization).
392
See supra text accompanying notes 47, 234–235(inferring the policy does not
identify how it is enforced or monitored).
393
See supra text accompanying notes 241–245, 252–254 (describing the costs
involved with different approaches to monitoring).
394
See supra text accompanying note 252–252 (explaining that allowing social
media eliminates some of the cost of monitoring and enforcement).
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employees have a more reasonable expectation of privacy because the
employer does not actively limit social media use. 395 However, some
companies may elect to proscribe the use of social media during working
hours because there is sufficient revenue to cover the monitoring and
enforcement expenses.396 Regardless of the policy adopted, employers must
draft a clear and robust policy to restrict employees’ reasonable expectations
of privacy in the event the employer conducts work-related investigations for
misconduct.397 Thus, it is important for the employer to notify employees
about the monitoring system and only implement a policy that reflects the
operational realities of the business.398
5. The Law Continues to Develop and the Approved Policy Does Not
Address All the Important Areas of Law Employers Need to Consider, such
as Unlawful Surveillance and What Constitutes Whistleblowing Online.
Employers must continue to update their social media policies
because the approved policy only reflects the GC’s current efforts to clarify
the law as it relates to protected concerted activity. 399 However, many
questions are left unresolved. 400 For example, the GC has not clarified
whether an employer engages in unlawful surveillance if a post is available
because the employer is a friend-of-a-friend, the employer engages in
surveillance by following a Twitter user, or the employer finds the
information on a publicly visible account. 401 When these issues become
resolved, the employer may need to revise its social media policies to reflect
the GC’s current interpretation and ensure the employer is not impinging on
employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity. 402 Employers should
refrain from asking employees or agents to view an employee’s Facebook or
Twitter on behalf of the employer until the GC clarifies his interpretation of
the law in these areas because such actions traditionally constitute unlawful

395

See supra text accompanying note 239 (stating that a clear and robust policy
shapes employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy and thus, a policy allowing social
media will result in employees expecting a high degree of privacy).
396
See supra text accompanying notes 241–242 (detailing the costs involved in
enforcing social media policies).
397
See supra text accompanying note 236 (encouraging employers to conduct an
investigation before action).
398
See supra text accompanying notes 224, 257 (recommending to employers to
provide a clear policy notifying employees how the policy is enforced and monitored).
399
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (citing the GC’s only three memos
analyzing social media use in the employment context).
400
See supra text accompanying notes 184–186, 205, 227–230 (describing current
ambiguities in the social media context).
401
See supra text accompanying note 184–186 (identifying these ambiguities in
unlawful surveillance).
402
See supra text accompanying note 48 (reminding employers the approved
policy is a template and drafting a social media policy requires a great deal of care).
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surveillance. 403 Also, an employer is advised to reveal the source of any
reported social media policy violations when disciplining or terminating an
employee for his or her online conduct because not every employee’s social
media settings are limited to “friends” only, and traditionally, an employer
engaged in unlawful surveillance by failing to reveal its source.404
Additionally, case law continues to develop in the area of
whistleblowing and anti-retaliation, and the approved policy does not offer
guidance for employers on this issue.405 Employers do not have a clear case
to rely on to draft a policy provision, so whether a report of social media
qualifies as whistleblowing or a report of bad conduct is uncertain.406 Until
these issues are resolved, employers are encouraged to complete a full
investigation on any potential whistleblowing or anti-retaliation conduct by
an employee before taking any disciplinary action or terminating the
employee.407
6. Employers Must Conduct a Reasonable Investigation Before
Terminating an Employee for Online Actions and the Employer Must
Determine Whether the Posts are Reasonably Related to the Employment
Terms and Conditions.
Finally, the policy should notify employees that a reasonable
investigation will be conducted before any employee is terminated for online
posts related to employment terms and conditions. 408 Employers may risk
liability for terminating an employee over social media discussions with
other co-workers because the posts may be employees working in concert for
mutual aid and protection, but employers do not risk liability when the posts
amount to personal gripes, egregious conduct, or actions for personal benefit
because such conduct is not protected by the NLRA. 409 Employers must
reference the GC’s previous memos for guidance in differentiating between
403

See supra text accompanying notes 131–133 (describing traditional actions
amounting to unlawful surveillance).
404
See supra text accompanying notes 132, 160–170 (stating the general rule
requires unlawful surveillance but, in some limited circumstances, the employer does not have
to reveal its source when viewing the employee’s posts limited only to “friends” because the
employee can reason a “friend” reported the postings to management).
405
See supra text accompanying note 205–206 (identifying an ambiguous area of
the law related to whistleblowing and anti-retaliation).
406
See supra text accompanying note 205 (stating that no case law addresses
whether a social media posting qualifies as a whistleblowing report).
407
See supra text accompanying note 206 (stating that employers are encouraged
to conduct an investigation before termination).
408
See supra text accompanying note 48 (stating employers must investigate any
violations of a social media policy).
409
See supra text accompanying notes 31–32, 137–170 (detailing the types of
activities the NLRA protects and further describing three scenarios where the employee
alleged he or she engaged in protected concerted activity so the employer needed to
demonstrate the terminations were not in response to protected concerted activity).
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protected and non-protected postings because an employer risks a court or
the GC concluding the employee was unlawfully discharged. 410 However,
employers must remember the NLRA’s application to social media is just
beginning, and the full parameters of that application have not been
identified because the GC continues to review cases addressing social media
in the employment context.
IV. CONCLUSION
The approved policy is a useful resource for employers, but it should
not be blindly implemented without additional considerations. 411 The
approved policy provisions are lawful where the employer understands the
current state of the law and drafts appropriate, limiting provisions. 412
However, the approved policy contains many gaps, which employers must
identify and correct before implementing the entire approved policy.413 For
example, employers with single-state enterprises must identify whether their
state has an off-duty protection statute, specific social media legislation, and
other statutes protecting employees, such as good-cause termination or antibullying statutes. 414 Further, employers must also correct the approved
policy’s threat to employees, the GC’s inconsistencies, and be sure to draft
policy language that clearly notifies employees how the policy is monitored
and enforced. 415 While this comment provides policy language
recommendations for specific social media provisions, in order to implement
successful social media policies, employers must stay abreast of changes in

410

See supra text accompanying note 45 (setting forth the GC’s three memos that
give employers guidance on what types of conduct constitutes protected concerted activity).
411
See supra text accompanying notes 364–368 (arguing the approved policy was
designed for a specific area and requires tailoring to each employer’s business).
412
See supra text accompanying notes 206–306 (arguing some of the approved
policy provisions are lawful because of sufficiently limiting language, sufficiently meeting the
FTC requirements, and not incorporating a savings clause).
413
See supra text accompanying notes 307–310 (articulating some of the failures
of the approved policy).
414
See supra text accompanying notes 226–232, 311–330, 365 (describing the
states with specific legislation, arguing the approved policy violates the statutory tests of offduty protection statutes, and reminding employers to consider state specific legislation when
drafting their policy provisions).
415
See supra text accompanying notes 267–268, 308, 331–337 (arguing the
approved policy contains a veiled threat to employees); see also supra 356–359, 391–398
(arguing the approved policy fails because it doesn’t notify employees how the policy is
enforced or monitored and recommending employers consider drafting language addressing
how the policy is monitored and enforced within their social media policy); see also supra text
accompanying notes 331–355, 374–387 (describing the GC’s inconsistency in his analysis and
arguing the inconsistency may be corrected by careful analysis of previous memos).
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the law, frequently update their social media policies, and always conduct a
reasonable investigation before disciplining or terminating an employee.416

416

See supra text accompanying note 408–410 (arguing employers must conduct a
reasonable investigation because the law continues to develop and there are still ambiguities in
the law).
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